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"Why Infer"? What the New Institutional
Economics Has to Say About
Law-Supplied Default Rules
J.P. Kostritsky·
A central question of contract law remains: when should the law supply a term not
expressly agreed to? Many scholars have addressed that question, yet the justification for lawsupplied terms often remains unconvincing. Because many proposals to supply terms do not
incorporate a comparative framework for assessing the costs and benefits oflegal interventions,
they are incompletely justified. T11is A11icle proposes that a comparative net benefit approach
(developed in institutional economics to explain private arrangements) be adapted and
expanded to resolve fundamental issues of legal intervention. This Article uses that framework
to critique the (1) hypothetical bargain and (2) Ayres/Gertner penalty defo.ult rule approaches to
law-supplied terms. Finally, this Article illustrates the benefits of the comparative framework
for resolving questions of law-supplied rules in the precontractual negotiation and
subcontractor bidding contexts.
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INTRODUCTION

The great question confronting judges and legal scholars is, in the
words of one of my colleagues, "Why infer?" 1 When and why is it
justifiable in contexts involvi_ng assent-based obligatio11..s2 for the law
to supply a term or commitment to which the parties did not expressly
agree?4
The issue of justification for law-supplied terms and obligations
is an important one. It underlies decisions as basic to law as: Should
the law even provide a forum for a dispute? 5 When should the law
simply take a "hands off' attitude by refusing to supply terms, 6 and
when should it intervene either through default rules 7 or by supplying
a term by implication?
The question of legal intervention in assent-based relations
crosses varied subject areas. Although these diverse areas often focus
1.
See Conversations with Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, and Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio (1997).
2.
Law-supplied assent-based obligations are meant to refer to legal interventions
which follow negotiations between the parties even in cases where the negotiations did not
result in the inclusion of a term which the law now proposes to include. Assent-based
obligations are distinguishable from tort obligations imposed without "communication
between the parties." E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law (Apr. 5, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Coffey Email (Apr. 5, 1997)].
3.
Supplying a commitment could take the form of a liability rule.
4.
Contracts scholars have addressed this question in the context of filling gaps in
incomplete contracts. Often the law-supplied commitment or obligation takes the form of a
default rule out of which parties may opt. Default rules are distinguishable from an
immutable rule "that parties cannot contractually abrogate." Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87, 88 (1989).
5.
Sometimes courts refuse to provide a judicial forum for a dispute and in so doing
decline to intervene. They refuse a judicial forum to illegal contracts to deter such
transactions. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, fllegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in
Modem Contract Theory, 74 IOWAL. REv. 115, 118-19 (1988).
6.
The traditional justification for the courts' refusal to supply terms is that to do so
would promote inefficiency. Had the terms been optimal, they would have been reflected in
the contract, absent transaction costs. The failure to include the terms must reflect the
parties' belief that the term was not optimal and should not be included. See Richard
Craswell, Freedom of Contract, The Coase Lecture 3 (Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 33, 1994) [hereinafter Craswell, Coase Lecture]; R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. I, 8 (1960) (describing tendency of parties to
reach optimal result regardless of assignment of initial liability rule).
7.
Professor Williamson alludes to the connection between institutional economics
and gap filling when he states: "The study of structures that facilitate gapfilling, dispute
settlement, adaptation, and the like thus become part of the problem of economic
organization." OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 56 ( 1996)
[hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE).

1998]

LAW-SUPPLIED DEFAULT RULES

499

on individual doctrinal issues, the real issue, which often remains
hidden, is one ofjustifYing the legal intervention itsel£ The court must
confront the question of whether the law should supply a term or
obligation to which the parties have not expressly agreed. It must do
this whether it grapples with (1) why and in what circumstances the
law should supply a fiduciary "performance obligation" in the
principal/agent context, 8 (2) why and when the law should supply a
term of irrevocability in section 45 option contracts9 or in
subcontractor bidding cases, 10 or (3) why the law should imply a
commitment in precontractual section 90 contexts. 11
Despite the centrality of the question of law-supplied obligation,
the means of resolution remain elusive. The contractual default rule
literature relied on to resolve the appropriateness of a variety of lawsupplied terms is flawed. 12 The literature often fails to utilize a
framework with realistic behavioral assumptions that can fully resolve
whether a legal intervention is justified. In addition, this literature
confuses situations that are fundamentally different in terms of the
nature of legal intervention involved and subjects them to a unified
default rule analysis. Such literature confuses cases in which a court
8.
See Ronald J. Coffey, Firm Opportunities: Property Right Assignments, Firm
Detriment, and the Agents Performance Obligation, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 155, 156 (1988)
(discussing the connection between the fomml economic models of principal/agent relations
and the Jaw-supplied or statutorily created fiduciary duty).
9.
See Richard Craswell, Offer. Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN L. REv.
481, 526-31 (1996) [hereinafter Craswell, Efficient Reliance]; Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining
with Unce11ainty, Moral Hazard and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for Precontractual
Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 624 n.4 (1993) [hereinafter Kostritsky, Bargaining with
Uncertainty] (suggesting framework for deciding whether law should supply a term of
irrevocability in option contracts); see also infra text accompanying notes 198-211.
I 0. See Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory
Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1267-81 (1996). Katz discusses
"whether treating early offers as binding options solves the problem of opportunism" in
subcontractor bidding cases. Id. at 1280; see also Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty,
supra note 9, at 690-92 (discussing precontractual commitment in subcontracting context).
11. See Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory
Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 443 (1987);
Randy E. Barnett, The Death ofReliance, 46 J. LEGAL Eouc. 518 (1996); Craswell, Efficient
Reliance, supra note 9, at 536-40; Daniel A. Farber and John H. Matheson, Beyond
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903
(1985); E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements:· Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217 (1987); Mark P. Gergen, Liability
for Mistake in Contract Formation, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1990); Katz, supra note 10; Juliet
P. Kostritsky, Reshaping the Precontractual Liability Debate: Beyond Shorl Run Economics,
58 U. Pm. L. REv. 325 (1997) [hereinafter Kostritsky, Precontractual Liability]; Edward
Yorio & Steve The!, The Promissory Basis ofSection 90, 101 YALEL.J. Ill (1991).
12. These law-supplied terms are also referred to as gap-fillers. See, e.g., Richard E.
Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORNELL L. REv.
785 (1982).
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"supplies terms in addition to or other than what the parties have
expressly bargained for" with cases in which the legal decisionmaker
refuses to add or subtract terms from the express bargain. 13 This
confusion diverts commentators from clearly identifying a :framework
to justify legal intervention in the form of an implied term.
Second, because authors often focus on the substance of a
particular default rule without a recognition that the default rule is lawsupplied and therefore must be justified, 14 they attempt to resolve
questions of implied obligation without reference to a well developed
comparative benefit methodology that is standard in new institutional
economics. 15 A comparative benefit methodology compares the costs
and benefits of the proposed scheme with various other strategies for
achieving common goals. 16 Such goals include maximizing the
surplus from trade 17 by controlling problems such as opportunism. 18
13. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (May 23, 1996) (on file with author). Such approaches constitute a
"default in the form of a refusal to engage in implication." !d.
14. For a discussion of the Hadley default rule, see infra notes 124-125 and
accompanying text. Professors Ayres and C'ertner discuss the Hadley rule and its possible
benefits. This rule could force disclosure of a party who would otherwise withhold
information that might be socially useful. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 103-04. But
they fail to focus on the Hadley rule as a law-supplied default rule which must be justified on
a comparative basis. See infra text accompanying notes 160-183.
15. "New Institutional Economics (1) holds that institutions matter and are
susceptible to analysis, (2) is different from but not hostile to orthodoxy, and (3) is an
interdisciplinary combination of law, economics and organization ...." WILLIAMSON,
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 3 (citation omitted); see also Edward L.
Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1413-16 (1996) (discussing new institutional
economics).
Institutional economics focuses on "differential transaction costs," and contends that the
effort to minimize transaction costs explains a variety of institutional choices. WILLIAMSON,
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 5. It views the control of opportunistic
behavior and moral hazard as a core problem. See id. at 5. It uses a set of realistic behavio<al
assumptions to assess whether governance solutions to the hazard control problem are costeffective.
Most importantly, institutional economics urges a methodology or
"remediableness" to assess and compare alternative approaches to solve problems and
maximize trade surplus. See id. at 7.
16. Professor Williamson developed this comparative methodology in his
remediableness approach. "The relevant criterion is thus that ofremediableness, according to
which an outcome for which no superior alternative can be described and implemented with
net gains is presumed to be efficient." !d.
17. "If we assume rationality, then it follows that, regardless of the risk attitudes of
particular parties, the dominant strategy for contractual risk allocation is to maximize the
expected value of the contract for both parties." Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of
Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 602 (1990).
18. Controlling opportunism in a cost-effective way is important "lest ... gains be
dissipated by costly subgoal pursuit." OLIVER E. WILLlAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 63 (1985) [hereinafter,
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Proposed default rules which lack a comparison of "feasible superior
alternative[s]"remain incompletely justi:fied. 19
Third, even when the default rule literature incorporates realistic
behavioral assumptions affecting the bargaining process, such as
strategic behavior/0 it fails to incorporate these assumptions into a
modef 1 that can ultimately justify the conclusion that the benefits and
costs of legal intervention outweigh the benefits and costs of other
approaches the parties might use to achieve common goals, given the
barriers to private contract solutions.Z2 While recognizing that
strategizing may cause inefficiencies/3 default mle scholars do not
explain fully why the presence of such inefficiencies cannot be solved
by other cost-effective private methods which do not involve a lawsupplied rule.Z 4 Nor do such authors explain how the presence of
strategizing in conjunction with asset specificity2 5 and bounded
rationalitY 6 may cause inefficiencies which cannot be readily solved

WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS]. "Because hazards are priced out, it is in the firm's
interest to provide safeguards in cost-effective degree." Oliver E. Williamson & Janet
Bercovitz, The Modern Corporation as an Efficiency Instrument: The Comparative
Contracting Perspective, in THE .A..JI.ill!'JCAN CORI'OMTION TODAY 327, 339 (Carl Kaysen ed.,
1996) [hereinafter Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modem Corporation]. Doing so will
presumably maximize the surplus available. "[T]he mitigation of hazards can be the source
of mutual gain." WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 60.
19. Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modem C01poration, supra note 18, at 333
(citation omitted). "The qualified version of the remediableness standard thus reduces to the
following: except as rebutted by exceptions of the kinds referred to earlier and elaborated
elsewhere outcomes for which no feasible superior alternative can be described and
implemented with net gains are presumed to be efficient." !d. (citation omitted); see also
WILLIAMSON, MECHANJSMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 7.
20. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 100 (discussing the tendency of a
party to act strategically by attempting to hide deficiencies in order to get a "cross-subsidized
price").
21. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 67.
22. See id.
23. Ayres and Gertner posit that strategizing will cause the high-cost miller to
conceal his type if there is no incentive in the legal rule to disclose his type, thus causing
inefficiencies to occur when the shipper fails to take cost-effective precautions. See Ayres &
Gertner, supra note 4, at 101.
24. Thus, while Ayres and Gertner addressed the loss in value caused by strategizing
by parties concealing their types, they did not consider whether private strategies, such as
screening for type, could solve the losses in a more cost-effective manner.
25. Asset specificity refers to investments that take the form of sunk costs, which
"are specifically tailored to the transaction and cannot be fully salvaged outside the
transaction." G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial
Contracts: Toward a New Cause ofAction, 44 VAND. L. REv. 221, 229 (1991).
26. Bounded rationality "is a semistrong form of rationality in which economic
actors are assumed to be 'intendedly rational, but only limitedly so."' WILLIAMSON,
ECONOMIC INSTJTIITIONS, supra note 18, at 45 (quoting HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINJSTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR at xxiv (2d ed. 1961 )).
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by express contracting. 27 Moreover, they fail to devise a structure for
determining how opportunistic hazards from strategizing can be
mitigated to maximize joint gains from trade in the most cost-effective
manner with the greatest net benefits. Thus they fail to invoke a wellknown comparative methodology 8 for exploring and comparing a
range of possible feasible solutions for persistent problems of
uncertainty and sunk costs when express private contract solutions to
rent-seeking behavior will be difficult or unattainable.Z9 Without that
methodology, the literature cannot explain why law-supplied default
rules should be preferred over other approaches.
Finally, while the body of literature on transaction cost
economics and the new institutional economics remains a potentially
rich source of solutions to the problem of justifying an implied
obligation, it remains partially inaccessible to the current students of
contract default rules. This Article will offer a framework to guide
decisionmakers in determining the appropriateness (efficiency) 30 of
law-supplied implied obligations,31 by highlighting the realistic
behavioral assumptions32 of transaction cost methodology as it is
27.
See id. at 67.
See Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modem Corporation, supra note 18, at 332-33
28.
(discussing the characteristics of a comparative "remediableness" methodology).
See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC lNSTITIJTIONS, supra note 18, at 67; see also
29.
William J. Baumol, Williamson s The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 17 RAND J. EcoN.
279, 280 (1986). Baumol noted:
Williamson lists three necessary conditions that, in the absence of externalities,
make it likely (if they are all satisfied) that efficiency problems will not
automatically solve themselves optimally through a marriage of the market
mechanism and contractual relationships. These three requirements ... are asset
specificity (sunk costs), ... "bounded rationality," ... and ... "opportunism."
Baumol, supra, at 280.
30.
This Article is concerned with promoting and analyzing efficiency in private
arrangements. "Theories of fair exchange" provide an alternative mode of interpreting
contracts and filling in gaps. David Chamy, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative
Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1815, 1839 (1991).
31. New institutional transaction costs economics is not concerned with law-supplied
rules per se. Instead it "works out of a private ordering rather than legal centralism approach
to contract law." WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 42. Despite
the reorientation of new institutional economics toward private ordering and away from law,
this Article concludes that the new institutional economics can and should address questions
of legal intervention, using the same framework developed to explain choices in private
ordering.
32. Of crucial import is the view of transaction cost economics that "behavioral
assumptions are important." !d. at 55. The emphasis on realistic behavioral assumptions,
with its recognition of such traits as bounded rationality, sunk costs, and moral hazard, must
be part of any effort to understand man and his institutions, including legal ones. See
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC lNSTITIJTIONS, supra note 18, at 44. Coase began this trend toward
a realistic assessment of behavioral assumptions with his frank recognition of the presence of
transaction costs. See Coase, supra note 6, at 16 (calling attention to the costs of market
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reflected in new institutional economics, emphasizing the "hazard
mitigation,"33 and comparing and assessing the arrangements to
determine which will yield the greatest net bene:fits.34
Part II of this Article seeks to remedy defects in current
approaches to law-supplied obligation by presenting a methodology
derived from the new institutional economics that can be used to
justify law-supplied obligations in a second-best world. 35 It adopts a
"framework" comparing "alternative feasible forms . . . with each
other"36 to determine whether the implementation of any law-supplied
rule would be efficient in the sense of increasing net gains. In its
current formulation, the comparative institutional approach is used
primarily to explain why parties have adopted various organizational
structures and thus to explain what actually exists. 37 Tills Article
suggests that the comparative net benefit approach of the new
institutional economics should be extended to cases where the parties
themselves have failed to adopt a term or resolve a matter by contract,
and a legal decisionmaker must determine whether supplying terms or
liability rules would maximize the joint gains from trade. 38 Law,

transactions and their effects in hindering the "optimal arrangement of rights"). Oliver
Williamson has heeded the Coasian injunction to formulate realistic behavioral assumptions.
See Oliver E. Williamson, Revisiting Legal Realism: 17ze Law, Economics, and Organization
Perspective, 5 INDus. & CoRP. CHANGE 383, 388 (1996) [hereinafter Williamson, Revisiting
Legal Realism] (explaining the Co asian approach of studying "[t]he process of contracting in
a real-world setting" (quoting Coase)). Hazard mitigation figures prominently in the
literature of new institutional economics. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF
GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 5 (explaining how "the study of governance is concerned with
the identification, explication, and mitigation ofall forms of contractual hazards.")
33. Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modem Corporation, supra note 18, at 332.
34. See id. (discussing principle of comparing "alternative feasible forms" and
rejecting approach based on comparing "feasible forms ... in relation to a hypothetical
ideal').
35. Second-best refers to an imperfect world in which we cannot reach the first-best
world which has no transaction costs. Second-best does not refer to the theory of second-best
in which an "action that is proposed cannot be evaluated until we see whether unintended
consequences make us worse off." Memorandum from Peter M. Gerhart, Professor of Law,
Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Jan. 30, 1998) (on file with author).
36. Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modem Corporation, supra note 18, at 332
(emphasis omitted).
37. For this reason, as Oliver Williamson explains, "[s]ome might object that the
remediableness standard exchanges utopian reasoning for Dr. Pangloss, and it is certainly true
that the remediableness standards is more deferential to 'what is."' !d. at 332-33.
38. Williamson explains that such maximization can occur through control of
opportunism. "Harmonizing the contractual interface that joins the parties, thereby to effect
adaptability and promote continuity, becomes the source of real economic value."
WILLIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note I 8, at 30.
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Economics, and Organization theorj 9 should set the stage for a new
approach to incomplete contracting.
Part III of the Article will examine and critique the Clli""Tent
hypothetical bargain default rule literature. At present, it has failed to
develop a comparative methodology to justify the presence of a lawsupplied obligation. This Part will also suggest that the deficiencies in
current theories of default rules, including hypothetical bargain theory,
must be modified to include a comparative net benefit standard in
order to provide a complete structure for determining what the parties
would want.
Part N will draw on the comparative analysis developed in the
first two Parts of this Article to critique the penalty default rule
methodology proposed by Ayres and Gertner. 40 This Part suggests that
while the penalty default rule methodology helpfully recognizes the
importance of strategic behavior in deciding how to craft default rules,
it still fails to provide a complete justification for a law-supplied rule
because it fails to provide a means of detennining whether a suggested
law-supplied rule will achieve greater net benefits than other
approaches in a second-best world. 41 Moreover, because Ayres and
Gertner fail to distinguish between default rules that supply terms and
those that refuse to do so,42 they fail to provide an explanatory theory
which can account for the variegated judicial approaches to contractual
gaps.
Ayres and Gertner's penalty default rule analysis cannot explain
the full range of approaches taken to basic issues of gap filling. They
argue that the courts' refusal to fill quantity terms left incomplete
stems from an underlying penalty default rule designed to force the
parties to reveal information about the quantity ex ante, because doing
so will efficiently save the courts the cost of filling in such quantity ex
post.43 However, the penalty default rule does not explain the very
different approaches taken to quantity terms in short- and long-term
contracts. In long-term contracts the courts are often willing to permit
the enforcement of requirements contracts44 in which the actual
quantity is not specified. In such cases, courts recognize that
39.
Law, Economics, and Organization theory is discussed in Williamson, Revisiting
Legal Realism, supra note 32.
40.
See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4.
4 I. See infra note 54 (discussing meaning of second-best to refer to an imperfect
world).
42. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
43. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 96 (explaining that "it is systematically
harder for the courts to figure out the quantity than the price ex post").
44. See U.C.C. § 2-306 (1995).
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persuasive barriers, such as the unforeseeability of the future, may
prevent the achievement of ex ante specificity and permit the
enforcement of what would otherwise be considered indefinite
contracts. 45
Part IV of the Article also challenges the Ayres and Gertner
attack on the "soundness" of the hypothetical bargain rationale. This
Article argues that the discrediting of the majoritarian hypothetical
bargain depends on a falsely perceived judicial rejection of majority
preferences. The results in these types of cases are better explained by
the law's disinclination to intervene to implement majority preferences
if no barriers prevent the private achievement of such goals. So
conceptualized, the cases are still consistent with a hypothetical
bargain rationale. 46
The presence of an underlying hypothetical bargain rationale in
these cases has been obscured by the failure of the legal decisionmaker
to employ a realistic model of behavioral assumptions and a
comparative approach.
These failures have hampered the
development of a fra...tnev~'ork for justi~f.u"tJ.g legal intervTentiorm. Vlit"'l
such a framework, courts could then determine whether a legal
intervention is efficient in the sense that "some selected objective ...
will be achieved at a higher level with the inteljection (intervention)
than without it, all things (benefits achieved and costs incurred, with
the intervention as compared without the intervention) considered,"47
and is therefore hypothetically preferred. Under this suggested
structure one can rationalize rules, such as the Hadley rule in
hypothetical bargain terms, although Ayres and Gertner have viewed
such rules as antimajoritarian, penalty default terms.
Part V will look at particular instances of law-supplied default
rules in precontractual negotiation. It will illuminate the underlying
frameworks and assumptions used to justify legal interventions in the
form of suggested law-supplied liability rules or terms. This Part
45. See infra notes 172-183 and accompanying text.
46. Hypothetical bargain methodology underlies much of current default rule
scholarship. One recent scholar (and critic) explains the approach as follows: "To interpret
contracts, lawyers ask: what would the parties have agreed to had they explicitly adverted to
the issue? That is, the interpreter constructs a 'hypothetical bargain': he determines how the
parties would have bargained to treat the situation that has arisen had it been directly
presented to them .... " Chamy, supra note 30, at 1815-16. For a discussion of how the
Hadley case can be rationalized under a reformulated hypothetical bargain standard see infra
notes 176-183 and accompanying text.
47. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (July 16, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter Coffey E-mail
(July 16, 1996)].
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suggests that current justifications for the particular default rules for
precontractual negotiation are flawed because they (1) fail to identifY
relevant structural features necessary to resolve whether a given lawsupplied rule will produce "a greater net benefit" and is therefore more
efficient than other altematives,48 (2) obscure the law-supplied nature
of the default rule, and (3) fail to develop a comparative framework.
Those analytical flaws are fundamental. They hamper the efforts
of commentators to (1) justifY liability rules which they propose,49
(2) explain the variability in judicial treatment of vague or incomplete
contracts,50 or (3) explain whether and in what circumstances the law
should intervene. 51
Part VI will use Williamsonian economics and the analytical
framework developed in this Article to resolve questions about the
nature and scope of law-supplied obligations in subcontracting. This
Part will suggest that current approaches fail to grasp the behavioral
realities of subcontractor bargaining, obscure the law-supplied nature
of the implied terms, fail to provide a comparative analytical structure
for resolving whether the law should inteiject an implied term, and
therefore reach inappropriate conciusions on when the contractor's
reliance should be protected. 52

II.

THE FRAMEWORK: THE "COMPARATIVE NET BENEFIT"
STANDARD

In · determining whether the law should intervene through a
"rearrangement of [legal] rights" 53 and supply terms or a liability rule
not expressly agreed to, one must first determine whether we are in an
ideal or a second-best world. 54 In a first-best frictionless world, the

48. See E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (July 11, 1995).
49. See infra Parts IV and V.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 172-183
51. See infra text accompanying notes 172-183.
52. See infra Part VI.
53. Coase, supra note 6, at 15.
54. By "second-best" this Article is not referring to the theory of second-best
pioneered by Lipsey and Lancaster. It instead refers to an imperfect world in which
persuasive barriers interfere with the achievement of a first-best contract achievable, by
defmition, only if such barriers did not exist. The Article rejects the nihilistic view of Lipsey
and Lancaster that the acknowledgement of imperfections and the absence of a frrst-best
world means that we cannot identify a hypothetically preferred bargain "because the
functions of imperfections cannot be sufficiently specified to optimize the interdependence
among them, and therefore the extent to which express or law-supplied terms can address
them is hopelessly indeterminate." Coffey E-mail (Apr. 5, 1997), supra note 2. For a study
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parties themselves can be expected to achieve completely contingent
55
contracts that maximize gains from trade and improve joint welfare.
In such a world, "the only thing then left to bargain over would be who
gets what gain from trade,"56 a matter about which contract law would
presumably remain indifferent. 57 The parties could be expected to
rearrange ''the initial legal delimitation of rights ... if it would lead to
an increase in the value ofproduction."58 Without frictions the parties
themselves could rearrange their rights and the "ultimate result (which
maximises [sic] the value of production) is independent of the legal
position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost. "59
Legal intervention would presumably be unnecessary.in such a world.
Because natural barriers beset the parties, however, a frictionless
world does not exist. A second-best world of positive transaction costs
including bounded rationality, asset specificity, and opportunism
exists 60 and parties may therefore fail to achieve contracts that achieve
the parties' assumed shared objectives. 61 The confluence of these
characteristics presents "serious contractual difficulties" for the
parties. 62 In this imperfect world, the legal decisionmaker must
determine whether and in what circumstances the law should supply a
term, given the inability of the contracting parties to achieve a firstbest arrangement. The governing principle for judging the efficiency
of legal interventions should be a comparative one.
That
determination would necessarily include a consideration of "the law
and economics of private ordering."63
of the theory of second-best, see R.G. Lipsey and K. Lancaster, The General Theory of
Second Best, 24 REv. EcoN. STUD. II (1956-1957).
55. See Coase, supra note 6, at 8. In such a frictionless world "[t]he moral of the
story is that if the market is working perfectly, there should never be any inefficient contract
terms, so efficiency can never be improved by forbidding certain terms." Craswell, Coase
Lecture, supra note 6, at 3.
56.
Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47.
57.
Ordinarily distributional effects are not central to efficiency analyses of legal
rules. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, The Relational Move: Some Questions from Law and
Economics, 3 S. CAL. lNTERDISC. L.J. 91, 100 (1993) (contrasting ordinary efficiency
analysis with distributional effects analysis).
58. Coase, supra note 6, at 15.
59. !d. at 8.
60.
Williamson discusses the importance of these behavioral assumptions in
transaction cost economics. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC lNSTITUI10NS, supra note 18, at
44-54.
61.
Common objectives include the maximization of the "expected value of the
contract for both parties. Only by allocating risks in order to maximize the joint expected
benefits from their contractual relationship can the parties hope to maximize their individual
utility." Scott, supra note 17, at 602.
62. WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 67.
63. !d. at 21.
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To date, the "remediableness" or comparative net benefit
standard has been used by transaction cost economists to explain that
the parties choose organizational structures and institutions to
minimize transaction costs. 64
In some instances, minimizing
transaction costs causes corporations to vertically integrate; "interfirm
contracting may be supplanted by internal organization. Markets give
way to hierarchies."65 Corporate decisions (such as whether to seek
vertical integration or engage in market contracting) can thus be
explained by a desire to minimize hazards of opportunism in the most
cost-effective ways. 66
The principle of remediableness requiring a comparative
assessment of net benefits has thus been used to explain a variety of
other organizational choices made by firms. Williamson has used a
comparative analysis of net benefits to explain "three struchrral
features . . . : perpetuity, autonomous contracting, and linuted
liability," characteristic of corporations. 67 He argues that those
organizational modes are tmdertaken precisely because they solve
certain hazards at a lesser cost than a range of alternatives. 68 In other
instances, transaction costs may explain the presence of "contractual
safeguards [which] will be introduced in the degree to which that is
cost-effective."69 These "include talce-or-pay clauses, penalty clauses,
reciprocal trading arrangements, and special information disclosure
and dispute-settling arrangements, of which arbitration is an
example."70
While the usefulness of the comparative assessment principle has
been evident as a means of explaining what exists (such as an
organizational structure actually undertaken), there has been a failure
to extend its stmcture beyond a rationalization of what exists to
include a determination of whether or when certain law-supplied mles
should be adopted to supplement private arrangements.

64.
"The discriminating alignment hypothesis to which transaction-cost economics
owes much of its predictive content holds that transactions, which differ in their attributes,
are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies, in a
discriminating (mainly, transaction-cost-economizing) way." WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF
GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 101.
65. Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modern Corporation, supra note 18, at 341.
66.
"The monopoly approaches ascribe departures from the classical norm to
monopoly purpose. The efficiency approaches hold that the departures serve economizing
purposes instead." WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 23.
67. Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modern Corporation, supra note 18, at 334.
68. See id. at 337.
69. !d. at 344.
70. ld. at 341.
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This Article suggests that the remediableness net benefit
comparison should be adapted to determine if and in what cases lawsupplied terms with what content would be appropriate. Under this
approach, if law-supplied terms would "move the parties closer to
what they wanted (in a narrow sense of economic welfare
improvement), minimizing the dead weight costs imposed by the
natural barriers (uncertainty, opportunism, and sunk costs) and thereby
increasing the gain from exchange,"71 than other alternatives, then a
legal intervention in the form of a default rule of implication is
appropriate.
Of course, the parties may use private devices or express
contracts to achieve their assumed welfare improvement goals. 72 To
determine whether a law-supplied rule will enhance joint welfare in
the above described sense, 73 the legal decisionmaker must first
determine whether the parties themselves can overcome the barriers to
maximizing the gain from exchange and if so, at what cost. Only after
determining that the law-supplied rule will maximize gains from trade
(and sumlus) bv overcoming: barriers at a cheaner cost than the narties'
private counterstrategies (thereby achieving greater net benefits)
should the legal decisionmaker determine that a particular lawsupplied rule would be preferred on a cost/benefit basis. 74
"

III.

.1

/

""

.....

DEFAULT RULE METHODOLOGY:
COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY

...

...

THE .ABSENCE OF A

The failure to grasp the relevance of the tmderlying comparative
benefit structure for justifying law-supplied interventions has obscured
current scholarly efforts to guide courts filling gaps in incomplete
contracts. It has led to the hypothetical bargain, a suggested method

71. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47.
72. These private counterstrategies can take many different forms. In the agency .
context, the parties face the same bounded rationality problems, as well as problems of
opportunism, which confront parties negotiating many types of contracts. Because of
bounded rationality problems, principals would have difficulty devising an express fully
contingent contract which could specify in advance ali of the choices that an agent might face
and devise specific contracts to control shirking. Consequently, the principal may employ a
series of other counterstrategies including monitoring, bonding, screening and ex ante
alignment schemes. See Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 654-57.
73. See supra text accompanying note 7 I .
74. See Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 651 ("This Article
addresses whether the law should supply a default rule by conducting a further analysiscomparing the costs of possible private mechanisms for overcoming the barriers to
contracting with those of a law-supplied rule.").
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for filling in contractual gaps. 75 In its current form, the hypothetical
bargain fails to justifY the default rules proposed under its aegis,
because the theory on which it is based ignores the comparative
framework, which is central to justifYing legal interventions, in a
number of ways.
First, some proponents of the hypothetical bargain seem to
assume incorrectly that the parties would have bargained to include an
express contract term, and thereby neglect the importance of other
types of "private orderings," highlighted by Oliver Williamson and
others. 76 Second, because they are premised on rules for a frictionless
world, hypothetical bargain rationales ignore the realistic behavioral
assumptions that are central to transaction cost analysis and new
institutional economics. Thus, they cannot provide solutions designed
for a second-best world in which persuasive barriers interfere with the
achievement of private contractual solutions. Third, the hypothetical
bargain rationales sometimes assume incorrectly that transaction costs
constitute the main or only barrier to private solutions, thereby
neglecting the full range of other barriers that interfere with private
solutions. 77 Finally, the hypothetical bargain rationales tend to neglect
the importance of a comparative assessment, central to a
Williamsonian remediableness analysis. Without that comparative
element, hypothetical bargain theory cannot determine whether a lawsupplied rule would be preferred to other strategies, including "private
orderings" undertaken by the parties.
In its traditional formulation, the hypothetical bargain purports to
justifY particular instances of law-supplied terms, by reference to a
projected hypothetical bargain. The law acts as a "facilitator[],
specifYing terms that the parties could formulate themselves if
unrestrained by time and effort costs."18 A similar formulation
provides that: "[o]n these simple assumptions, transactors would not
75. Hypothetical bargain methodology including "fundamental issues of method and
justification" are discussed generally in Chamy, supra note 30. For a discussion of
hypothetical bargain methodology, see supra note 46.
76. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance: Framework and
Implications, in ECONOMICS AS A PROCESS: ESSAYS IN THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
171, 171 (Richard N. Langlois ed., 1986).
77. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
78. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits ofExpanded Choice: An Analysis
of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261, 266
(1985) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Goetz & Scott, Expanded Choices]; see also Douglas
G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38
V AND. L. REv. 829, 835-36 (1985) (embracing default rules that "provide all the parties with
the type of contracts that they would have agreed to if they had had the time and money to
bargain over all aspects of their deal").
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have to write down any terms at all. Transactors would lrnow that the
law enforces whatever terms the transactors would specify;
consequently, transactors need not actually incur these costs to get the
benefits of the term."79 The role of the court in supplying default rules
under hypothetical bargain theory is to minimize transaction costs for
the parties by supplying a set of preformulated terms mimicking
"arrangements ... most bargainers prefer." 80 Idiosyncratic parties can
easily opt out of these law-supplied default rules. 81
One major difficulty with the prior formulations of hypothetical
bargain default rules is that they suggest that the courts should supply
terms which the parties would have agreed on had the circumstances
been brought to their attention and had the parties had adequate time to
negotiate a relevant contract provision. Many of these formulations of
default rule methodology seem to assume, at least implicitly, that the
court ought to fill in gaps with what the parties would have bargained
to. These formulations apparently assume that there is a contractual
provision to which the parties would have bargained given sufficient
time. As Easterbrook and Fischel explain, "[c]orporate law-and in
particular the fiduciary principle enforced by cou..rts---fills i.t1 the
blanks and oversights with the terms that people would have bargained
for had they anticipated the problems and been able to transact
costlessly in advance."82 The formulation suggests the adoption of
default rules with the contract provisions that the parties would have
ultimately adopted, if they had the time and foresight to negotiate.
The hypothetical bargain approach seems flawed because it does
not appear to admit that the parties might have opted for other
solutions, given the barriers to express contractual solutions. Had an
issue been directly presented to them, the parties might well have
chosen not to adopt a contractual solution at all but rather to opt for a
noncontractual private solution. 83 Thus, at least some hypothetical
79. Chamy, supra note 30, at 1840.
80. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971 (1983) (emphasis omitted)
[hereinafter Goetz & Scott, Mitigation Principle]. There is some debate about the "extent to
which the adjudicator [should] particularizeD her formulation to the particular transactors
whose dispute is before her-adjusting the formulation for particular transactors' judgments,
preferences, perceptions and so forth." Chamy, supra note 30, at 1820.
81. They can opt out because default rules are not immutable. See Ayres & Gertner,
supra note 4, at 89 (contrasting default rules with immutable rules).
82. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 1416, 1444-45 (1989).
83. These private solutions figure prominently in new institutional economics which
has placed an emphasis on "private ordering through ex post governance." Wn.LIAMSON,
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at I 0 (emphasis added). Of course, there is still
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bargain approaches to gap filling incorrectly assume that the parties
would have bargained to an express contract term, and neglect to
advert expressly to noncontractual private solutions.
These
approaches downplay the importance of noncontractual alternatives
which should be considered as part of a comparative institutional
assessment.
In addition, because some formulations attempt to derive
hypothetically preferred terms by positing terms which the parties
would have bargained toward in a frictionless world, they cannot
provide solutions for a world in which frictions do exist in the form of
uncertainty, opportunism, and sunk costs. 84 In that frictionless
scenario, "[t]he only thing left to 'bargain' over would be who gets
what portion of the total gain from trade." 85 Because a frictionless
world is unattainable, and a second-best world of frictions inevitably
exists, it is important to recognize the frictions that parties face and to
assess default rules in terms of their abilitv "to solve the ba..'Tiers
problems that the parties would want, given a ~econd-best world."86
Even hypothetical bargain formulations which recognize that
some frictions exist are flawed because they seem to assume
(incorrectly) that a particular barrier-that of boimded rationalityconstitutes the only barrier to the parties adopting a contractual term.
If, however, the transaction costs ofbounded rationality constituted the
parties' only obstacle, then, as Professor Williamson argues, the parties
themselves could presumably resort to "general clause contracting,"
under which the parties would use general clauses which do not
"require comprehensive preplanning;" 87 there would be no need for
law-supplied rules. Suggested gap filling in cases where the only
assumed obstacle is transaction costs would therefore not justify a lawsupplied gap filler because the parties might devise general clauses to
make up for their lack of foresight. By postulating a world of low
transaction costs as the basis for determining what provisions would
have been adopted, certain default rule methodology ignores the
complexity of the barriers (other than transaction costs) which prevent
a role for contract law ·to play because "each generic mode of governance (market, hybrid,
hierarchy, etc.) is supported by and in significant ways is defmed by a distinctive form of
contract law. The idea of contract laws (plural) rather than of a single, all purpose law of
contract thus plays an active role in transaction cost economics." !d. (citations omitted).
84. See Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47.
85. !d.
86. !d.; see also Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 651.
87. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 48, 67. "Unanticipated
events could be dealt with by general rules, whereby parties agree to be bound by actions of a
joint profit-maximizing kind." !d.
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the parties from achievi_ng lheir goals. Again, oPJy after havi_ng
identified those barriers can a legal decisionmaker recognize the
barriers which prevent a private contractual solution and inquire into
whether parties could devise other private mechanisms to achieve
shared goals, and if so, at what cost.
Another analytical difficulty with many default rule formulations
is that they suggest the law should adopt a rule that the parties might
hypothetically have wanted in order to lower transaction costs, without
first determining whether intervention would achieve a certain
objective better (at less cost) than any private strategies available to
parties. Such methodology ignores the central issue of why/when a
law-supplied rule is preferable to nonintervention, and thus avoids lhe
injunction of Professor Williamson that "transaction costs are always
assessed in a comparative institutional way."88
The formulations seem to suggest that the law should adopt a
default rule whenever doing so would lower the "absolute magnitude
of transaction costs."89 The Expanded Choice Postulate, 90 for
example, suggests ''that implied terms expand contractors' choices by
providing standardized and widely suitable 'preformulations,' thus
eliminating the cost of negotiating every detail of the proposed
arrangement." 91
Prior formulations of the hypothetical bargain
rationale suggest that the law adopt, as default rules, terms that will
save parties from incurring transaction costs. Without a comparative
assessment, however, such formulations cannot determine which
strategies will better achieve the parties' goals, given the barriers
which do exist.
Ayres and Gertner's discussion of the origins of contractual
incompleteness and the parties' responses to the high transaction cost
of providing for every contingency illustrates the absence of a
comparative assessment. In that discussion, Ayres and Gertner posit
that the parties weigh the costs and benefits of providing for a
The discussion, however, only incorporates a
contingency. 92
cost/benefit analysis in which parties weigh the actual costs of
transacting with the "benefits of contractually addressing a particular
contingency. " 93 Thus:
88. !d. at 22. A comparative assessment should include a consideration of private
strategies.
89. !d. As Williamson points out, "it is the difference between rather than the
absolute magnitude of transaction costs that matters." !d.
90. See Goetz & Scott, Expanded Choices, supra note 78, at 262.
91. !d.
92. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 93.
93. Jd. at 93.
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Contracts may be incomplete because the transaction costs of explicitly
contracting for a given contingency are greater than the benefits. These
transaction costs may include legal fees, negotiation costs, drafting and
printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and probability of a
contingency, and the costs to the parties and the courts of verifYing
whether a contingency occurred. Rational parties will weigh these
costs against the benefits of contractually addressing a particular
.
94
contingency.

Ayres and Gertner then explain that under the "would have wanted
approach," courts will choose to fill gaps to "rrrinimize the costs of
contracting by choosing the default that most parties would have
wanted."95
The use of the "would have wanted approach" is bound to
promote incorrect gap filling. The cost-benefit analysis fails to include
a consideration of alternative private approaches which the parties
might have used to overcome certain problems such as opportunism,
given the presence of bounded rationality and sunk costs. 96 Without
that comparison, it is hard to discern whether a law-supplied rule
would indeed be preferred as the one that could achieve the greatest
"net benefits."
Charny's explication of several types of hypothetical bargain
approaches to filling in contractual gaps also lacks a comparative
approach. For example, Charny indicates that "[i]f the adjudicator
readily can determine that all transactors would bargain to rule X, and
would bargain around any other rule Y that differed from rule X, then
she should adopt rule X" 97 That "would sharply reduce the cost of
transacting."98 This particular formulation ofthe hypothetical bargain
94. !d. at 92-93 (footnote omitted).
95. !d. at 93. My colleague, Andrew Morriss, points out that an unwanted side effect
of default implication is that it may create an "incentive to save on transaction costs by
leaving terms to the courts. This may inappropriately reduce the costs of contracts" in
comparison to other choices. See Comments of Andrew P. Morriss, Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law.
96.
Ayres and Gertner are themselves critical of the traditional approach to gap filling
which attempts to save parties the transaction costs of negotiating for each contingency.
They argue that default rule methodology is geared too much to solving problems of
"contractual incompleteness," which originate in transaction costs of drafting relevant
provisions. They argue that it fails to account for "a second source of contractual
incompleteness,"-namely strategizing. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 94. To address
contractual gaps originating in such cause Ayres and Gertner propose an alternative rule to
counteract such strategizing. This Article argues that though the recognition of this
alternative "source of contractual incompleteness" is important, the proposed penalty default
rule itself fails to justify the proposed law-supplied rule because it fails to engage in a
complete comparison of alternative approaches.
97.
Chamy, supra note 30, at 1847.
98. !d. at 1841.
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neglects the analysis which should precede any inteijection of a lawsupplied term. That analysis should consider (1) whether persuasive
barriers prevented the achievement of an express bargain and the
express adoption of a particular rule (X, Y) and (2) whether the lawsupplied rule (X or Y) or a private solution will achieve the pat-ties'
joint goals, such as maximizing surplus, in a more cost-effective way.
A second formulation of the hypothetical bargain by Charny also
neglects the relevant comparison to private strategies. He states that:
If some transactors will bargain around rule X, and other [sic] will not,
then the relevant total cost of rule X is the costs of bargaining around
plus the costs of ex post opportunistic behavior under the rule for those
who stick with it. The adjudicator should aggregate the costs for each
alternative rule and choose the rule with the lowest total cost.99
To justify intervention fully, the adjudicator should also consider
whether the parties' private strategies for achieving their goals would
be more costly than a law-supplied rule. Hence, the comparison must
include not only alternative law-supplied rules, but also private
strategies for achieving the parties' joint goals. The adjudicator should
consider not only the costs of bargaining around Rule X and the
inefficiencies resulting from not bargaining around Rule X, but also
should compare that aggregate cost to private strategies' costs that
parties could use to achieve efficiencies. 100
Thus, the hypothetical bargain rationale, as it has often been
interpreted, does not provide a complete structure for determining
what the parties would have wanted, given existing frictions. It
assumes that the determination of hypothetically preferred terms can
be made without reference to a cost-benefit comparison to private
strategies, in tenus of their relative capacity to overcome a multiplicity
of extant barriers.
Even criticisms of the hypothetical bargain rationale 101 . and
suggested improvements in the application of the theory do not
provide a decisionmaker with a complete model. These suggested
improvements still lack a comparison of the costs of private and lawsupplied strategies for achieving the parties' presumed joint goals,

99. !d. at 1848.
100. An alternative formulation by Chamy states that "(i]f transactors will not bargain
around whatever rule that the adjudicator would adopt, the adjudicator should adopt the rule
that minimizes ex post costs of opportunistic behavior to transactors taken as a group." !d. at
1847-48. What is obscured in this formulation is a direct inquiry into whether a law-supplied
rule would be preferred as the means of reducing opportunistic behavior over private
strategies for achieving that same goal.
10 I. See, e.g., id. at 1840-48.
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such as the maximization of the surplus from trade. 102 Thus, even
suggested changes to the hypothetical bargain still would not pennit a
court to justify a law-supplied rule as the least costly solution to any
perceived problem hampering maximization ofjoint surplus.
Some criticism of hypothetical bargain theory suggests that the
theory is unusable in its current form 103 because of problems of
method arising at the level of"generality"104 and "idealization."105 For
example, the legal decisionmaker does not know whether, in crafting a
legal rule to govern workers and firms, 106 the court should look to
individual workers and firms, 107 or to all workers and firms. 108 Nor
does the decisionmaker know, in formulating a preferred default rule,
how ideal he should assume transactors to be. 109 The assumption is
that resolution of the idealization and generality issues would eliminate
the "confusion" in applications and allow one to apply the hypothetical
bargain formula to reach correct results. 110
Attempts to correct the hypothetical bargain theory by resolving
idealization and generality questions will not achieve the framework
for justifying a law-supplied term and are therefore misplaced. To the
extent approaches to hypothetical bargains even contemplate idealized
bargainers, they will fail because they direct the decisionmaker away
from realistic behavioral assumptions. Moreover, the focus on
resolving "generality" issues suggests that there is some way to divine
what the parties themselves would want if one could decide whether to
look to the individual transactors or to some larger group to determine
preferences. Generality issues divert the decisionmaker from key
"factors responsible for differences among transactions," including
bounded rationality, opportunism, and sunk costs. 11 1 It is the
identification of those factors, together with a model of the parties'
assumed goals based on average preferences that would help the

l 02. See Goetz & Scott, Mitigation Principle, supra note 80, at 973.
103. See Chamy, supra note 30, at 1816-17 (discussing both difficulties in how to
apply the hypothetical bargain theory and more "fundamental problems of justification" in a
theory which binds parties to obligations "to which we did not assent explicitly").
l 04. "Generaiity refers to the extent to which the adjudicator particularizes her
formulation to the particular transactors whose dispute is before her .... " ld at 1820.
I 05. "By idealization, I mean the degree to which the interpreter constructs the
bargain as it would be struck by idealized rather than real-world transactors." !d. at 1820-21.
I 06. Charny discusses this example in the context of examining "whether to imply a
good faith term in an employment contract." !d. at 1816.
107. See id. at 1820-21.
I 08. See id.
109. Seeid. at 1817,1820-21.
110. Seeid.at1816-20.
Ill. WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 52.
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decisiomnaker to develop a better "predictive theory of economic
organization."112 Identification of these factors would also assist the
decisiomnaker develop a framework to help determine whether a lawsupplied gap filler term would better achieve the parties' goals (by
overcoming the barriers at a lesser cost) than any private strategy. A
focus on the individual worker versus all workers 113 directs the
decisionmaker from focusing on assumed joint goals such as the
maximization ofthe surplus from trade. 114 A.n assessment ofwhat the
parties hypothetically want cannot be made without a recognition of
common goals. Furthermore, the assessment requires a comparison of
private strategies devised to overcome obstacles to achieving the
parties' assumed joint goals and law strategies for achieving such
goals.
Traditional formulations of the hypothetical bargain standard,
even in revised forms, improperly look exclusively within the contract
to determine what the parties would bargain toward.
These
formulations neglect to emphasize the confluence of obstacles that the
parties face in the achievement of mutual gains. Tnese obstacles
include: behavioral uncertainty or opportunism, bounded rationality,
and sunk costs. 115 Economists tell us that when those behavioral
characteristics occur together, barriers may make it difficult for the
parties to achieve their goal of maximizing mutual gains because of
contractual di:fficulties. 116 Once those characteristics are recognized, it
becomes incumbent on a legal decisionmaker to compare the costs and
benefits of private strategies for overcoming those barriers with those
of law-supplied rules. 117 By neglecting to emphasize the behavioral
attributes which interfere with mutual gain achievement, the
methodology fails to inquire as to "how a law-supplied rule could
move the parties closer to what they wanted (in a narrow sense of
economic welfare improvement), minimizing the deadweight costs of
112. !d.
113. See Chamy, supra note 30, at 1816-17.
114. See WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note .18.
115. See id. at 45,47-49,52-54,56-59.
116. See id. at 67.
117. Thus a legal decisiorunaker deciding whether to supply a just cause limit on an
employer's right to discharge should consider whether "the commitment accords with the
objectives likely to be sought, on average, by parties who deal in a less than fully explicit
manner; ... there are implicit social or other costs to not imposing the commitment ... [and]
the alternative private devices are more costly than the benefits they could achieve."
Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 674; see also Stewart J. Schwab,
Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8
(1993) (discussing a "coherent framework for understanding the· default rules for
employment termination").
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transacting imposed by .the natural barriers (uncertainty, opportunism
and sunk costs) and thereby increasing the gain from exchange."118
The model should instead "make[] assumptions about what [the]
objectives of parties are and why they did not get there," 119 and
compare the costs and benefits of using law-supplied terms with the
costs and benefits of private responses to overcome barriers interfering
with mutual goal achievement.

IV. PENALTY DEFAULT RULES: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH THAT
STilL LACKS A JUSTIFICATIVE METHODOLOGY

The failure of default rule literature to develop fully a
methodology which can justify law-supplied rules helps to explain the
dissatisfaction with the current default rules. Ayres and Gertner attack
the default rule literature for its lack of "a detailed theory of how
defaults should be set." 120 Additionally, in cases involving "rentseeking, strategic behavior," 121 they propose to substitute a penalty
default rule "purposefully set at what the parties would not want-in
order to encourage the parties to reveal information." 122
This Article challenges Ayres and Gertner's argument that the
recognition of the reality of strategizing by the parties and the
deficiencies in current default rules should be solved by replacing the
hypothetical bargain with a "penalty default rule." 123 While the
penalty default rule offers an apparently plausible rationale of forcing
the disclosure of strategically held information, ultimately the penalty
default rule fails to guide decisionmakers on how to fill in contractual
gaps for several reasons. In order to tmderstand why the penalty
default theory fails as a means for assessing when the law should
intervene with a term not expressly negotiated, it is important to
understand the nature of the Hadley and non-Hadley rules that Ayres
and Gertner discuss in terms of the nature of legal intervention at issue.
In a sense, the court in Hadley v. Baxendale had to decide
whether to intervene with a particular form of sanction----consequential
damages-which was not expressly adopted by the two parties to the
contract. 124 In Hadley, the court held that (1) the law should intervene
I 18. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47.
I 19. Id.
120. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 9 I.
121. Id.at94.
122. Id. at 9 I.
123. While Ayres and Gertner are correct in arguing that justifications for default rules
will remain thin without an underlying theory of "how defaults should be set," id. at 9 I, the
solution does not lie in the adoption of a penalty default rule.
I 24. I 56 Eng. Rep. I 45, I 45 (Ex. I 854 ).
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by supplying implied damages that are foreseeable, but (2) specifically
declined to intervene with a law-supplied rule granting consequential
damages unless the special circumstances have been previously
disclosed. 125 In that second prong of the Hadley rule, the court actually
declines to intervene to supply a damage rule granting consequential
damages without prior disclosure by the parties. At the same time, the
court indicates a willingness to imply nonordinary consequential
damages if the parties had previously disclosed the special
circumstances.
Thus, the Hadley case is a complicated example to use as a
paradigm for judging the appropriateness and efficiency of lawsupplied intervention in the form of a law-supplied term granting
foreseeable losses, refusing to intervene to supply a sanction for
consequential losses in the presence of active withholding of
information, and suggesti_ng an. apparent hypothetical willingness to
supply consequential damages with disclosure.
Without an
understanding of these interventionist and noninterventionist aspects
of the Hadley ruling, it becomes difficult to assess the importance of
Hadley for resolving the critical question of when and why it is ever
appropriate for the law to intervene with a term or liability rule if the
parties have failed to negotiate one.
Ayres and Gertner's treatment of the Hadley rule fails to
distinguish between the first prong of Hadley, which constituted a
default rule supplying a damage term by implication, and the second
prong of the Hadley default rule, which refused to imply the omitted
damage terms absent prior disclosure. 126 That analytical failure
obscures the circumstances which justify a legal intervention in the
form of an implied term and hampers the ability of penalty default rule
scholars to offer a rule which can explain and justify the full range of
approaches taken by courts to solve contractual gaps. The real
problems with current default rules cannot be improved without a
methodology which (1) rigorously accounts for the behavioral
attributes of transactions and (2) compares the costs and benefits of
law-supplied rules with other private strategies to determine which
approach would be preferred because it is capable of achieving greater
net benefits. This Article concludes that the hypothetical bargain is
still a persuasive explanatory theory at least if it is enhanced to include
a realistic model of behavior and a comparative approach. If
reformulated in the above described fashion, hypothetical bargain
125. Seeid.at151.
126. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4.
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theory can provide a useful methodology for justifying law-supplied
rules.
Thus, although the suggested adoption of a penalty default rule
has proved remarkably popular, 127 it, like the traditional hypothetical
bargain, still lacks a complete methodology for justifying intervention
taking the form of a law-supplied term. 128 Because an underlying
framework for detel111in.D.1g when it is appropriate for the law to
intervene through a default rule is missing from Ayres and Gertner,
their methodology remains obscure and some of their applications of
the methodology are unconvincing.
The shift from a hypothetical bargain rationale to a penalty
default rule approach remains as unsatisfying as current formulations
of the current default rule, because it too lacks a methodology aimed at
explaining why the parties did not achieve their goals on their own and
what, if anything, the law should do about it. The analytical focus
should be on whether a law-supplied default rule, of whatever
character, can solve the goal of the "mitigation of all forms of
contractual hazard'' 129-the "source of mutual gain" 130-in such a way
that "no feasible superior alternative can be described and
implemented with net gains," 131 rather than on a tenninological debate
on whether we denominate default rules as hypothetical bargains or as
penalty default rules for punishing "rent-seeking."
To resolve issues of whether legal intervention in the form of a
default rule of implied obligation is justified on a comparative "net
benefit" basis, the methodology must include a complete model of
realistic behavioral assumptions. 132 Although Ayres and Gertner admit
to the propensity to strategic opportunism which may affect the
parties, and seek to craft a legal penalty default rule designed to
penalize the strategic withholding of information, their analysis fails to
justify adoption of the legal rule for two reasons. It fails to account for
a full range of behavioral assumptions. Because they do not identify
the full range of "factors responsible for differences among
transactions,"133 they fail to focus on the behavioral attributes of
bounded rationality and sunk costs. Without a recognition of all the
factors and the full range of behaviors, Ayres and Gertner cannot
127.
128.
129.
omitted).
130.
13 I.
132.
!33.

A recent Westlaw search revealed 149 citations to the Ayres and Gertner article.
See infi"a notes 137-160 and accompanying text.
WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 5 (emphasis
!d. at 60.
Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modem Corporation, supra note 18, at 333.
See id. at 328-30.
WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTI1UT!ONS, supra note 18, at 52.
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explain why a law-supplied rule would be needed. As Professor
Williamson explains, even if opportunism were present and "assets are
specific but economic agents have unrestricted cognitive competence
. . . . [A] comprehensive bargain is struck at the outset. . . . Contract
execution problems thus never arise." 134 Thus, if opportunism were
present, it would presumably still be feasible for the parties to devise a
contract to control for such propensities, were it not for bounded
rationality. Similarly, even with opportunism and bounded rationality,
were it not for transaction-specific sunk costs, "[p]arties to such
contracts have no continuing interests in the identity of one another." 135
In such cases, parties could simply resort to the market for relie£ 136
By focusing primarily on strategizing and not admitting to the reality
of bounded rationality and sunk costs, Ayres and Gertner cannot
explain why private contract solutions or market solutions are not
feasible. Thus, Ayres and Gertner do not provide the foundation for
exploring a range of solutions, whether in the form of private
arrangements or law-supplied interventions, to the market and contract
failures.
L11 the context of the Hadley fact pattern, a multitude of factors
may interfere with contractual and market solutions to the problem of
opportunism by the high-risk miller who wishes to conceal his type in
order to secure a lower shipping cost. Bounded rationality could make
it difficult and costly to design schemes to control the opportunistic
nonrevelation by high-risk millers. These schemes might include a
menu of contracts with different prices to ferret out different types of
millers. Additionally, because the carrier invests sunk costs in hauling
the miller's product, the carrier could not seek market relief by simply
selling the shipping services to another party because they are not
salvageable in that fashion.
An examination of these behavioral attributes of sunk costs and
bounded rationality would help to lay the foundation for a lawsupplied rule by highlighting the difficulties and costs of private
counterstrategies for combating opportunism. By failing to focus on
all the behavioral attributes, Ayres and Gertner's embrace of a lawsupplied rule remains problematic.
Ayres and Gertner's justification for the Hadley rule also remains
problematic because it fails to examine whether the presence of
identified strategic behavior, by itself, justifies legal intervention in the

I 34. I d. at 30-31.
135. Id. at 31.
136. Seeid.
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form of a particular default rule. Their failure to address that
fundamental inquiry can be explained by their failure to parse the
Hadley rule in terms of legal intervention. Consequently, they have
viewed the Hadley rule as a penalty default rule that is an example of a
legal intervention or response to strategic behavior. 137 Yet, they fail to
brealc Hadley into its three parts: (1) the court's law-supplied term of
ordinary and foreseeable damages, (2) the court's law-supplied term of
consequential damages with prior disclosure, and (3) the court's
refusal to supply a term of consequential damages absent prior
disclosure.
Because of that analytical failure they completely fail to focus at
all on the aspect of Hadley which does intervene by supplying
consequential damages if there has been prior disclosure. Therefore,
they fail to ask whether the law-supplied aspect of the Hadley rule
. would operate to achieve the parties' goals at a lesser cost than other
private mechanisms. The justification for the legal intervention that
rlnP~
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consequential damages with prior disclosure-remains incomplete.
Ayres and Gertner appear to focus on the prong of the Hadley rule
which is actually a failure by the law to intervene, a refusal to engage
in implication. They regard the refusal to intervene as equivalent to a
case of an intervention of a law-supplied term or liability rule. They
never attempt to explain why the Hadley rule-judicial intervention
implying consequential damages with prior disclosure-is the
preferred means of curbing opportunism. They do not explore other
possible solutions to opportunism, including private ones. Ayres and
Gertner seem to assume that the presence of strategic propensities
alone will 'justify strategic contractual interpretations by courts" as a
way of"reduc[ing] the opportunities for this rent-seeking behavior." 138
In assuming that courts should control rent-seeking behavior (to avoid
inefficient gaps), Ayres and Gertner have assumed, perhaps
incorrectly, lhat the role of law is to "reduce the opportunities for this
rent-seeking behavior." 139
Oliver Williamson argues that given the inevitable presence of
opportunistic behavior, with its consequent inefficiencies, the question
becomes how the ill effects of such rent-seeking behavior can be
minimized. 140 Parties themselves might adopt certain governance
137. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 103.
138. I d. at 94.
139. Jd.
140. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 48, 63; Williamson
& Bercovitz, The Modem Corporation, supra note 18, at 332.
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structures (such as vertical integration) to minimize such opportunistic
behavior. The questions become: (1) how the transaction costs can be
minimized and (2) with what approach (governance structure, private
counterstrategy or legal default rule) will the parties be able to achieve
greater "net benefits." Minimizing such transaction costs would not
necessarily entail the adoption of a law-supplied rule and thus it is
misguided for Ayres and Gertner to assume that it is for the law to
"reduce the opportunities for this rent-seeking behavior." 141 Parties
themselves may be able to control for opportunism in more costeffective ways. Because they have focused exclusively on the
declining to intervene aspects of Hadley, they have avoided the
comparative analysis central to justifying law-supplied terms.
The failure to engage in a comparative approach assessing
relative net benefits has also led Ayres and Gertner astray by focusing
their inquiry on the benefits of a particular default rule in encouraging
the disclosure of information. As they explain, "by setting the default
rule in favor of the uninformed party, the courts induce the informed
party to reveal information, and, consequently, the efficient contract
results. "i 42
Of course, once they point out the efficiency benefits of having
the information disclosed, it seems incontestable that the law should
encourage such revelation. In reality, however, this analysis obscures
the question for the legal decisionmaker. The question is not whether
there are any benefits to be gained from a law-supplied default ·rule,
but whether the benefits from the law-supplied Hadley ruleintervening to grant consequential damages with prior disclosure and
declining to do so absent disclosure-are greater than the benefits that
could be obtained by private efforts, given the obstacles hindering
efficiency that exist (including strategizing).
Resolving the question of which approach will achieve greater
"net benefits" requires a recognition that the Hadley and Baxendale
problem (identified by Ayres and Gertner) raises the well lrnown
problem encountered in the insurance context: that of adverse
selection and of asynnnetric information. 143 The catTier cannot tell if

141. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 94.
142. !d. at 99.
143. Adverse selection is an insurance term and "is a consequence of the inability of
insurers to distinguish between risks and the unwillingness of poor risks candidly to disclose
their true risk condition." WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 47; see
also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BusiNEss 37, 38-40 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)
(discussing adverse selection as problem of "hidden information").
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he is dealing with a high-cost or low-cost miller. 144 Based on the
recognition of adverse selection and the propensity to conceal one's
type, Ayres and Gertner argue that a default rule should be adopted
which gives the high-cost miller consequential damages only if the
information is disclosed. The Hadley problem is like all situations in
which there is adverse selection: because a less informed party may
not be able to recognize the difference between two types, a pooling
problem exists.
Once the adverse selection problem is accounted for, the central
question is whether the law should intervene with a term implying
consequential damages if information is disclosed, but at the same
time refuse to supply such consequentials absent disclosure. Ayres
and Gertner do not fully resolve that question. Ayres and Gertner's
analysis of the Hadley rule rests on a comparison of "two possible
defaults: denying or awarding the high, unforeseeable damages." 145
They conclude that intervening to supply consequentials with
disclosure, but declining to do so absent disclosure will be preferable
to the non-Hadley rule. This is so because the Hadley rule will
encourage high-cost millers to contract around the rule and doing so
will result in a "'separating' equilibrium,"146 in which high-cost millers
reveal their type and thereby avoid the inefficiency and cost associated
with the nonrevelation of the high-cost types. Ayres and Gertner argue
that the Hadley rule thus helps to avoid the inefficiencies and costs that
would be generated under a non-Hadley rule when the high-cost
millers choose, for strategic reasons, "to remain undistinguished from
their low-ris.k counterparts. " 147
Ayres and Gertner compare the efficiencies that would be gained
from the adoption of a legally supplied Hadley rule with the
inefficiencies that would arise under the adoption of a non-Hadley
high damage rule that gave consequential damages without regard to
whether special circumstances were revealed. Inefficiencies would
result under a non-Hadley rule because the high damage millers would
conceal their type, causing the carries to take insufficient
precautions. 148 A non-Hadley rule would provide no incentive for type
revelation because "high-damage millers will not reveal their true
144. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at Ill (detailing tendency of high-cost miller
to conceal information about its status in order to "receive the subsidized shipping price" that
will obtain when the shipper cannot distinguish between high- and low-cost millers).
I45. !d. at 108.
I46. See id. at I I2.
I47. Id.at!II.
I48. See id. at I I2.
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status to the carriers because they would be forced to pay more ... but
149
would gain no additional coverage."
What Ayres and Gertner do not resolve through their comparison
is whether a law-supplied damage rule of a particular content granting
consequential damages with prior disclosure would be preferred to
both (1) a law-supplied rule granting consequential damages absent
disclosure and (2) private strategies that the parties might employ on
their own to induce separation. In choosing an appropriate default rule
one must recognize that opportunism and self-concealment are
pervasive and are likely to arise in situations where bounded
rationality and sunk costs are present. To fully resolve whether a lawsupplied damage rule of a particular content is justified and would
maximize joint gains from trade better than other possibilities,
including both private and law-supplied rules, one would have to
compare other mechanisms that carriers could devise to overcome the
pooling problem, such as screening devices to identify low- and highcost millers and signaling by low-cost millers to identify their type. To
determine whether there is any justification for the law supplying the
Hadley damage rule, one would have to ask: 150 would such a rule
maximize joint gains from trade by
moving the parties closer to what they wanted in a narrow sense of
welfare improvement, minimizing the deadweight costs of transacting
imposed by the material barriers (uncertainty, sunk costs and
opportunism) and thereby increasing the gain from exchange ...
count[ing] all the benefits and costs of imposing a law-supplied term, as
contrasted with the benefit and costs of not doing so? 151

A decisionmaker cannot decide, in the abstract, whether th-e Hadley
rule is preferred without reference to a comparative net benefit
assessment.
The legal decisionmaker cannot decide if the law-supplied
Hadley rule is justified by comparing it to a law-supplied rule giving
all consequential damages even if special circumstances are not
disclosed. 152 The question should be whether the law-supplied Hadley
rule can better promote separation (and thereby the prevention or
reduction of the loss and in~:fficiency that results from poolingY 53 at a
149. !d. at 111.
150. See id. at 103 (alerting reader to menu concept and noting its complexities).
151. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47.
152. This is what Ayres and Gertner appear to do when they compare the costs and
benefits of a Hadley rule with an alternative legal rule granting all consequential damages
even if special circumstances are not disclosed by the affected party beforehand.
153. See Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47.
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lesser cost than any private strategies to contain such loss and thereby
maximize joint gains from trade. Will the award of a sanction and
remedies afforded by the Hadley rule achieve greater net benefits over
private strategies designed to achieve the loss from non-separation that
inevitably results from strategizing (and opportunistic behavior) by the
parties. Assuming that the parties want to maximize efficiency gains,
and that certain barriers, including adverse selection, interfere with the
achievement of those efficiency gains, the law should seek to intervene
with a law-supplied term only when there is a greater "net benefit"
from doing so than the net benefits from alternative approaches, such
as private mechanisms designed to curb opportunistic behavior and
overcome adverse selection problems.
Revision of the methodology used to determine whether the law
· should supply the Hadley rule would lead to an expansion of the
analysis used in judging whether a particular rule is efficient. Ayres
and Gertner explain:
High-damage millers will contract armmd the Hadley, low-damage
default when the cost of inefficient precaution ... is larger than the cost
of contracting around the default . . . . If the additional costs of
contracting around the Hadley default are sufficiently small, all highdamage millers will contract for the efficient amount of insurance. 154

Ayres and Gertner posit that the effect of the Hadley default is that
high-damage millers will no longer withhold information and
separation will occur.
The question should not be whether the Hadley rule will induce
separation but rather whether the law-supplied Hadley rule or other
law-supplied rules or private strategies (such as offering different rate
contracts) will be able to achieve the greatest reductions in the loss
from pooling and the greatest increase in joint gains from trade and net
benefits. If that comparison is inquired into, then the Hadley rule may
still be preferred, though it is not automatically the preferred rule.
Once the comparison of relative net benefits is extended to
include private counterstrategies, it becomes easy to understand why
the "comparison" must extend beyond a contrast of the Hadley-rule to
the non-Hadley high-damage default rule so central to the Ayres and
Gertner analysis. Comparison with a different law-supplied rule
cannot resolve the ultimate question of whether private strategies or
law-supplied rules will curb opportunistic behavior and maximize
gains from trade.

154. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at II 0.
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In considering
The methodology should be reformulated.
whether the law-supplied sanction ought to include consequentials
when special circumstances are not disclosed, adoption of which has
not been specifically negotiated by the parties, the legal decisionmaker
should consider the likely inefficiencies from pooling that would apply
if the court implied no damage rule at all unless expressly negotiated.
The legal decisionmaker should also consider the results if the parties
are left to negotiate private solutions to pooling, as well as the relative
inefficiencies that would be attained under a law-supplied Hadley lowdamage default and a non-Hadley high damage default.
Reformulation of the methodology for law-supplied interventions
to include a comparative net benefit standard of the kind suggested in
this Article would be advantageous. Not only would it provide the
basis for fully justifying a law-supplied rule, but it could help to
explain, with more robust explanatory power than the penalty default
rule, a variety of other gap filling default rules. The methodology of
this Article suggests that a court should intervene if it is convinced that
persuasive barriers including opportunism, sunk costs, and uncertainty
prevent the achievement of assumed goals and if it is convinced that
iegal intervention will "move the parti~s closer to what they wanted" 155
in a second-best world than other private mechanisms would.
This comparative approach could enhance the analysis of a
variety of default rules. One such rule examined by Ayres and Gertner
is the default rule refusing to supply a quantity term where the parties
fail to agree on one. 156 Ayres and Gertner label this approach a penalty
default rule because a court will ordinarily refuse to supply any
quantity should the parties fail to select a quantity. This refusal stands
in contrast to a variety of other default rules, in which courts supply a
wide variety ofterms by implication. 157 Ayres and Gertner explain the
"zero quantity" default rule as a penalty default rule (preferred by
neither party) designed to force the disclosure of information ex ante
by the parties. 158 As Ayres and Gertner explain:

155. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47.
156. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 95-97.
157. For example, "Another term that courts often supply is one imposing a duty of
'best' or 'reasonable' efforts." E. ALLAJ'I FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17, at 509 (3d ed.
1999). Courts may supply terms which are missing "the terms of the contract are reasonably
certain." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981). Courts may also imply
obligations of good faith which have not been expressly agreed to. See id. § 205. Courts
have also implied obligations not to revoke offers which have been relied on. See id. §§ 45,
87. Courts have also supplied just cause limitations "protecting employees against
opportunistic terminations." Schwab, supra note 117, at 38.
158. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 95-97.
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We suggest that the zero-quantity default crumot be explained by a
<;what the parties would have wanted" principle. Instead, a rationale for
the rule can be found by comparing the cost of ex ante contracting to
the cost of ex post litigation. The zero-quantity rule can be justified
because it is cheaper for the parties to establish the quantity term
beforehand than for the courts to determine after the fact what the
parties would have wanted. 159

The rationale suggested by Ayres and Gertner-that ''it is cheaper
for the parties to establish the quantity tenn beforehand than for the
courts to determine after the fact what the parties would have
wanted" 160-seems to explain the unwillingness of courts to supply the
missing quantity term. However, the rationale is an incomplete
explanation that does not fully explain the approach taken by the
courts to contractual gaps. A complete explanation for the approach of
courts' refusal to supply a term (such as quantity) cannot be developed
without reference to the larger group of cases involving the issue of
whether and under what circumstances the courts will supply a term
regard~1g quantity if the parties have not agreed to it expressly.
The courts do not uniformly refuse to supply an implied term in a
contract lacking a quantity term. 161 Where courts do refuse, that
re:fhsal to intervene by supplying quantity should be cast as a rule in
which courts refuse to supply a term by implication, thus refusing to
add or delete terms agreed on by the parties. Because Ayres and
Gertner treat the refusal of courts to supply a term (for instance,
quantity) on the same terms as a legal intervention which takes the
form of a law-supplied rule (for instance, the Hadley mle) and attempt
to offer a unifying rationale of forced information disclosure for both,
they fail to focus on the critical issue of when and why a court should
refuse to supply a term and when and why it should intervene through
a law-supplied term. When this distinction is drawn, it becomes clear
that the refusal of courts to supply a quantity term is not a legal
intervention of a default rule of implication requiring justification. If
one draws careful distinctions between cases which warrant legal
intervention in the form of an implied term from those that do not, then
one can rationalize the full range of approaches taken.in particular
doctrinal areas and develop more persuasive explanations for the

159. Id.at96.
160. Id.
161. An example in which courts may enforce a contract lacking a specific quantity
term is the requirements contract in which "the buyer's duty to purchase is determined by its
requirements, as to which the buyer has some discretion." FARNSWORTH, supra note 157,
§ 7.17.
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courts' variegated approaches than the penalty default information
disclosure rationale.
Recognizing the distinction between default rules that supply
implied terms and default rules that refuse to do so would help to
explain the differing approaches to the issue of omitted quantity tenns.
In some instances, the courts refuse to intervene by supplying a
quantity term. 162 The true rationale for such refusal, however, does not
lie within the penalty default/information forcing rationale. The true
reason for courts refusing to supply quantity, at least in one-shot spot
trades, is that there is no particular reason for courts to intervene with a
law-supplied tenn when there are no persuasive barriers to the parties
reaching a fully contingent contract by specifying quantity on their
own. 163 In other instances where the quantity is not specified,
however, and the transaction is more complicated because it is a longterm contract and sunk costs are required by one or both parties, the
court will imply a tenn of good faith to determine whether a particular
quantity demanded should be honored. 164 In such cases, courts are
willing to allow parties to specify, only incompletely, the quantity
term. The true explanation for the court's greater willingness to imply
a term of good faith to supplement gaps in the quantity tenn is that in
some contexts the parties can operate only in a second-best world
beset by natural barriers to complete contractual specificity. Parties to
a long-term contract, because of bounded rationality and uncertainty
problems, may be unable to foresee the quantities required, which may
be over a long term period of time, and thus be unable to commit ex
ante to a completely contingent express quantity term in the contract.

I 62. See cases cited in Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at n.43.
I63. Presumably, the problems of bounded rationality can limit the possibility of
comprehensive contracting when there is uncertainty. The unforeseeability of the future
would not be particularly burdensome when the transaction is discrete and not continuing.
Nor would the characteristic of opportunism pose particular contracting difficulties in cases
in which there is no opportunity for such behavior. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS, supra note I 8, at 48. Finally, the absence of sunk costs would mean that the
parties could simply arrange for "new trading relations." Jd. at 59. Thus it would not be
important to devise governance structures or contract terms to minimize the hazards and costs
9f opportunism.
I 64. Courts are thus willing to enforce indefmite quantity terms in the context of
output and requirement contracts. Output and requirements contracts lack a defmite quantity,
specifYing either that quantity shall be such as to meet a buyer's requirements or that the
quantity shall b.e measured by the seller's output. These contracts are governed by section 2306 of the U.C.C. That section provides for an implied term of good faith in order to
determine whether a buyer's demands under a requirements contract or a seller's output
under an output contract should be honored. See U.C.C. § 2-306 (1995). Thus, courts may
be willing to allow the quantity to remain unspecified in contexts in which it is not feasible to
achieve an express contract.
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Problems of opportunism might interfere with a general clause under
which "[u]nanticipated events could be dealt with by general rules,
whereby the parties agree to be bound by actions of a joint profitmaximizing kind." 165 In such cases, because of the impediments to the
parties specifying a fully contingent quantity term by express contract
ex ante, and because of the costliness of obstacles to less burdensome
alternatives, a court may be willing to imply a term of good faith to
measure quantity. Because the implied term (of good faith) may be
preferred to any other solutlons166 that the parties themselves could
devise to achieve their goals while "minimizing the deadweight costs
of transacting," 167 the court may supply it. The rationale seems tied
not so much to a desire of comis to force the disclosure of information,
as it does to a desire to limit cases of judicial intervention to instances
when the costs of parties specifying a term may be more costly than
the court's solution. Thus, the focus should not be on whether it is less
costly as a general matter to force parties to agree on a term ex ante
t"'Jan to have the cow--t supply it ex post. Rather, it should be on an
identification of those circumstances in which the parties can adopt a
term to achieve their purposes more cheaply than the court and to
separate those circumstances from cases in which it may be cheaper
for the court to intervene with an implied term, given the costliness of
private efforts to achieve a goal such as ma::1taining flexibility and
curtailing opportun.i.sm with regard to quantity demands in a long-term
contract.
Calling the zero quantity default a penalty default rule does not
have enough robust explanatory power to rationalize the full range of
approaches talcen by courts on the quantity issue. A recognition of the
barriers which may interfere with the parties' assumed goals allows
one to rationalize both approaches. Thus, courts refuse to supply
terms where barriers do not exist and at the same time willingly supply
terms when barriers to greater contractual specificity do exist, by
supplementing quantity terms with a good faith discretionfuy
component.
Limitations in the explanatory power of the per.alty default rule
can also be seen in the discussion of corporate statutes. The full range
of judicial approaches taken to contractual gaps and the greater
explanatory power of this approach is tied to an analysis of the barriers
to contracting and a comparative net benefits approach. Courts "refuse
165. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC lNSTIT1ITIONS, supra note 18, at 48.
166. These might include a general clause promising not to act opportunistically.
Because of problems of opportunism, that solution may not be feasible.
167. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47.
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to enforce corporate charters" 168 made without information on "the
number of authorized shares, the address . . . for legal process and,
indeed, the state of incorporation." 169 Ayres and Gertner analogize the
corporate law approach to the common law's "refusal to enforce vague
or indefinite contracts."170
However, the courts are not uniformly opposed to filling in gaps
in contracts; sometimes they are willing to enforce contracts with
vague terms. 171 Therefore, the central question is what explains the
variability in the willingness oflegislatures, and courts to supply terms
or enforce otherwise vague contracts. The true explanation for the
legislatures' unwillingness to enforce corporate charters made without
the number of authorized shares may be that no persuasive barriers
exist to prevent the parties from specifYing that information on their
own. In contrast, in cases where persuasive barriers might have
interfered with the achievement ex ante of a complete contingent term,
the court might be willing to enforce contracts that would otherwise
fail for indefiniteness. In these cases, courts will consider the costs of
mechanisms that the parties might themselves undertalce to overcome
barriers to specificity and consider the costs of such mechanisms along
with the costs oflegal intervention.
Open recognition of the remediableness methodology together
with a clear understanding of the difference between a court refusing
to supply a term and a court intervening with a law-supplied term will
not only provide a better means of explaining the range of approaches
talcen, but it will also permit decisionmakers to understand and justify
law-supplied rules in tenns of the seemingly discredited hypothetical
bargain rationale. The discrediting of the majoritarian hypothetical
bargain basis for implied default rules depends on Ayres's and.
Gertner's suggestion that in some cases it may be preferable to choose
a rule not preferred by the majority. 172 They posit that "ifthe majority
is more likely to contract around the minority's preferred default rule
(than the minority is to contract around the majority's rule), then
choosing the minority's default may lead to a larger set of efficient
contracts.'' 173

168. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 98.
!69. !d. at 97-98.
170. !d. at 98.
171. See, e.g., Borg Warner Corp. v. Anchor Coupling Co., !56 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 1958)
(holding that a contract to sell company existed despite indefmiteness in agreement relating
to terms for key employees).
172. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 93.
173. !d.
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Choosing the rule preferred by the minority seems to undermine
the majoritarian premise for implied default rules. However, the
seeming rejection of a majority's default rule may be based not on its
majoritarian character but on an analysis of whether significant
contracting barriers prevented the adoption of the majority's preferred
rule. "[I]f the majority is more likely to contract around the mi_r1ority's
preferred default rule" 174 than vice versa, it may well be that the
majority can achieve its own goals by contract, and thus there would
be no persuasive basis for the court to intervene by supplying a rule.
However, if it is difficult for the minority to contract out of the
majority's preferred rule, that may well be because persuasive barriers
to contracting exist which prevent the minority from achieving
efficient contracts on its own.
Thus, the court's reason for intervening would be that barriers to
contracting exist and the law-supplied rule will achieve greater net
benefits than either (1) nonintervention or (2) ot.~er private strategies.
Thus, the rejection of the majority's preferences in formulating a
default rule may depend, implicitly, on an assessment of why the
parties did not achieve their objectives by express contractual
provision and whether the law should intervene by supplying a term.
In cases where the majority could easily "contract arotmd the
minority's preferred default rule" 175 ~he court may conclude that
barriers to achievement of the parties' own goals did not exist. In such
a case, the court is and should be disinclined t\.; intervene because the
parties can achieve their goals privately.
In contrast, where significant barriers exist, as might be the case
where the minority has difficulty contracting out of the majority's rule,
there may be grounds for a law-supplied rule. This rule is most
appropriate when the court is convinced on a comparative cost basis
that the law-supplied rule will achieve the parties' preferences better
than any private counterstrategies the parties might implement to
overcome barriers to private contracting. Thus, the basis for rejecting
a majority's preferences may be based not on a rejection of the
preference because it is shared by a majority, but because there is no
reason to intervene where barriers to achieving the parties' own goals
do not exist.
Once the realities of a second-best world beset by natural barriers
is fully recognized and the decisionmaker accepts that it may not be
possible to achieve what the parties would want in a first-best world, it
174. !d.
175. !d.
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becomes possible to rationalize the Hadley rule itself in terms of a new
and more robust version of the ''would have wa11.ted" hypothetical
bargain standard. 176 Under that standard, the court intervenes with a
law-supplied damage rule in cases where the intervention best
decreases the "deadweight loss" and does so more cheaply than any
private strategies the parties might use.
To justify the Hadley rule-which implies consequential
damages with prior disclosure-in hypothetical bargain terms, one
begins with a world in which one must make certain assumptions
about the parties' objectives. It must be assumed that the parties
jointly want to maximize the gain from trade "irrespective of who ends
up with what portion of the gain." 177 At the same time it must be
recognized that in the Hadley scenario, as in most contracting
scenarios, the parties themselves must necessarily operate in a secondbest world, 178 which contains natural barriers that will interfere with
the achievement of the parties' goals. In this second-best world, the
parties will presumably choose rules which will "most reduce
deadweight loss."179
Under this second-best world, the Hadley rule may be justified in
terms of what the parties would want. Arguably, the parties ''who
would be revealed as worthier than others by the imposition of a
default rule that separates them from the inferior[,] actually 'want' ex
ante such a rule." 180 The Hadley rule, for example, "permits them [the
worthier lower damage millers] to better separate themselves than
would private strategies," 181 and thus to save themselves the costs of
signaling and separating. The law-supplied rule is thereby preferred at
some point, namely when the benefits from separating are outweighed
by the costs of signaling such information. The lower damage millers
who do not opt out of the rule are automatically identified as lower
damage millers and therefore ''worthier." Even the inferior (the highcost millers), who would arguably prefer to remain indistinguishable in
order to receive a "cross-subsidized price" 182 from the carrier, will not
want to do so. An inferior party would not complain because "it is
hard to see why he would complain, except to pine for a supernormal
profit from a pooling equilibrium which as Akerlof points out, is
176. I am indebted to my colleague, Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, for his valuable insights on this subject.
177. CoffeyE-mail(July 16, 1996),supranote47.
178. See Memorandum from Peter M. Gerhart, supra note 35.
179. Jd.
180. See Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47.
181. Jd.
182. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 100.
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transitory at best, because the worthies keep dropping out." 183 Thus,
even the high-cost millers would be no worse off under a Hadley rule
permitting separation.
The Ayres and Gertner penalty default approach fails to separate
out the strand of Hadley which represents a legal intervention from the
strand of Hadley which represents a refusal to intervene by
implication. By disguising the law-supplied aspect of Hadley, the
authors hamper their ability to recognize the need for a justificative
analysis for law-supplied terms. They also fail to develop or utilize
comparative methodologies which examine the costs and benefits of
private solutions, and fail to develop an explanatory theory io explain
fully differences in the variability in the willingness of courts and legal
decisionmakers to intervene with law-supplied terms.

V.

LAW-SUPPLIED OBLIGATIONS IN THE PRECONTRACTUAL CONTEXT

Default rule methodology should be incorporated by legal
decisionmakers who must decide in a variety of contexts whether to
intervene with a law-supplied obligation when the parties have failed
Because many "practical
expressly to adopt the obligation.
constraints" 184 limit the parties' ability to achieve a fully contingent
contract that resolves all matters ex ante, gaps in contracts are
inevitable. 185
One context in which the parties may fail to resolve all issues by
an express reciprocal agreement and in which the issue of lawsupplied obligation will command central attention is that of
preliminary precontractual negotiation. In this context, one party will
seek to withdraw, claiming that free withdrawal is permitted because
the parties did not achieve a contract with consideration; the other
party will claim that its justifiable reliance ought to malce the promise
irrevocable and binding. The issue that arises is whether the law
should imply any commitment to govern the precontractual
negotiations.
Many of the current attempts to resolve questions of
precontractual reliance protection are misguided: they suffer from a
failure to develop an underlying framework which can resolve the
question of legal intervention. First, they do not adequately identify
183. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47 (referring to George A. Akerlof,
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN.
488 (1970)).
184. See Chamy, supra note 30, at 1819.
185. See WILUAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 70 (discussing
impossibility of completely contingent contracts in certain settings).
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the relevant structural features of the transaction which are responsible
for "differences among transactions" 186 and which would help to
resolve whether a law-supplied rule would be necessary or whether
private contractual solutions or other private arrangements are
possible. They obscure the law-supplied nature of the suggested
default rule and thus fail to grapple with a well recognized
comparative methodology useful in detennining iflegal intervention is
justified. In determining if such intervention is justified, the rule
proposers fail to compare the costs and benefits of a law-supplied rule
of implied commitment with private mechanisms which could be
employed by the parties to overcome the barriers to contractual
solutions.
A.

Craswell sApproach

Professor Craswell's scholarly treatment of precontractual
reliance illustrates a recent attempt to resolve the question of implied
commitment for precontractual negotiations. 187 Craswell 's treatment
of the topic ulti_mately fails to justify fully a law-supplied commitment
in the precontractual context because it lacks crucial elements of a
justificative framework. Craswell fails to identify all of the behavioral
assumptions in his analysis of the transactions at issue. While the
analysis adverts to a salient feature of precontractual negotiations-the
presence of asset specific investments of one party-which may make
the investing party choose ''too little reliance, relative to the efficient
level,"188 there is a failure to advert to the other crucial transactional
features, namely bounded rationality and opportunism.
Without a full treatment of those transactional features, it is not
clear why the parties themselves could not solve the suboptimal
reliance problem by contractual devices. The failure to account for all
of these differences makes it difficult for a decisionmaker to resolve
the question of whether a law-supplied obligation is needed. As
Oliver E. Williamson explains, when one or more, but not all, of these
features is present, private contractual or market solutions are still
possible. 189 Thus, the presence of sunk costs, even in conjunction with
opportunism, could presumably still be solved by contract if bounded
186. I d. at 52.
187. See Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 9. Professor Craswell also treats a
number of other "contract formation doctrines," and considers them all through the unifying
theme of "the efficiency of ... reliance" by the promisee. Jd. at 507; see also Kostritsky,
Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 342-62 (discussing Craswell's methodology).
188. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 9, at 492.
189. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 30-31.
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rationality were not a problem and "economic agents have unrestricted
cognitive competence." 190
Consider alternatively the situation where agents are subject to
bounded rationality and transactions are supported by specific assets,
but the condition of opportunism is assumed to be absent ....
Although gaps will appear in these contracts, because of bounded
rationality, they do not pose execution hazards if the parties take
recourse to a self-enforcing general clause. 191
The failure to highlight the structural barriers to private solutions
helps explain another defect in Craswell's approach to precontractual
liability: the failure to compare the "benefits (including costs avoided)
and costs (including benefits foregone) of imposing ... a law-supplied
term or terms, as contrasted with the benefits and costs of not doing
so." 192 Without a full account of the structural barriers, one cannot
compare the costs and benefits of the private strategies which might be
used to overcome the barriers to achieve certain goals, such as curbing
opportunism, in order to maximize the available surplus with the costs
and benefits of a law-supplied rule.
The failure to explore the reality of the structural defects of a
second-best world helps to explain why Craswell is willing to suggest
the presence of a law-supplied implied commitment without a
comparative analysis. Instead, Craswell based his endorsement of an
efficient reliance approach on the perceived benefits to both parties
from such a commitment. He explains that "courts are entitled to
consider the efficiency of B[uyer]'s reliance." 193 In effect, Craswell
justifies a rule of irrevocability and of enforceable obligation based on
the perceived mutual benefits to the parties. 194 Craswell uses projected
mutual benefits to the parties to explain why parties themselves might
agree to such enforceable commitrnents 195 and thus as a reason why
courts might or should imply an enforceable obligation to protect
efficient reliance. The justification for the rule, however, seems
incomplete. A proposal to justify a law-supplied connnitrnent must
rest on a foundation other than perceived mutual benefit. If the
obligation is in the interest of both parties, then a legal decisionmaker
deciding whether to imply a tenn not agreed to must face the question
190. !d. at 30.
191. !d. at 31.
192. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47.
193. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 9, at 507.
194. See id. at 495.
195. See id. (discussing mutual benefits to Buyer and Seller from an enforceable
obligation).
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of why the parties did not expressly adopt the term or obligation. 196
Resolving that question requires the decisionmaker to advert to the
structural barriers facing the parties and interfering with private
solutions to handle perceived problem_s-such as opportunism-which
interfere with agreed-on goals such as the maximization of gains from
trade. Only by adverting to those structural barriers and comparing
private "noninterventionist ways of sunnounting those barriers"197
with the law-supplied rules can legal intervention be justified fully.
The failure to advert to the structural barriers interfering with
private solutions can also be seen in Craswell's treatment of unilateral
contracts. Traditionally, the unilateral contract rule permitted the
offeror to revoke any time up until the offeree completed
performance. 198 Modem law is to the contrary: Restatement (Second)
of Contracts section 45 protects the offeree who begins performance
by making the offer irrevocable upon such commencement. 199 ill
effect, courts are implying a term of irrevocability though the parties
did not expressly bargain for one. 200
Because the offeror '\vill not have explicitly stated whether she
wanted her commitment to become irrevocable once B [offeree] began
to perform,"201 there is an impmia11t i.11terpretive question
(aclmowledged by Craswell) for courts: should the court nevertheless
supply a term of irrevocability. Craswell resolves that question of
interpretation by reference to the offeror's hypothetical intent: "it is
easy to find cases where courts seem to interpret S(eller]'s offer as
irrevocable when B[uyer] begins to perform precisely because
B[uyer]'s reliance is the sort that S[eller] would have wanted to
induce. "202
The question that remains unanswered in Craswell's projections
for unilateral contract contexts is why the parties did not negotiate and
bargain for protection of the Buyer's reliance. For example, when
addressing the question of whether brokers should be protected,
Craswell points to the increased willingness to "treat commissions
offered to real estate brokers as unilateral contracts that become
196. See Kostritsky, Precontractual Liability, supra note 11, at 359 ("[A]nalysts of
precontractual reliance must still explain why the parties' self-interest does not result in
expressly agreed to commitments and what, if anything, the Jaw should do when the parties
fail to adopt express terms which would be hypothetically preferred.").
197. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47.
198. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 157, § 3.24.
199. See REsTATEMENr(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 45 (1979).
200. See Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 9, at 527.
201. Jd.
202. Id.
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irrevocable once the broker begins expending time and effort to find a
buyer. " 203 Craswell explains that without such protection, the brokers
would have diminished "incentives to invest time and resources in
finding a buyer."204 He therefore concludes that a law-supplied ruie of
irrevocability would actually favor owners, because "owners may
actually prefer to bind themselves in advance."205 Craswell's analysis
and resolution of the question of law-supplied obligation seems
incomplete because it lacks reference to the structural bar-Tiers that
might inhibit private contract solutions to the problem of diminished
incentives and pose costly obstacles to other private efforts to
overcome such barriers.
A close analysis of the contexts in which courts imply a term of
irrevocability based on partial performance reveals the barriers that
may exist to hinder the negotiation of an enforceable contract with
consideration. For example, in the reward context the owner of the
lost item does not know ex ante who the finder of the lost item will be
and thus does not know with whom she should negotiate a contract.
Hence, a problem of bounded rationality (uncertainty) exists and it
would be costly to expend resources to identify the most likely finders.
Similarly, the potential finder of the lost item does not know in
advance that he will be the ultimate finder of the item so he does not
even contemplate the need for any contractual protection. Moreover,
the potential finder of the item may be disinclined to negotiate
contractual protection for any interim steps talcen because he knows
that the owner cares only about interim steps which prove successful
and those interim steps are not readily discernible. Furthermore, the
owner-offeree faces problems of bounded rationality; she does not
know in advance which interim steps to bargain for because she does
not lmow which steps will yield successful results.
Despite the obstacles to negotiating contractual provisions,
finder-offerees all face the problem of the opportunistic expropriation
of their sunk costs; once the lost item is found-the owner could
renege. Once the offeree takes almost all steps toward completion, the
owner-offeror could yell: "I revoke." Yet, the offeree would think that
contractual protection ex ante would be unnecessary because the
offeror would hardly be expected to renege if the offeree actually
delivered the lost item or achieved virtual completion of the task.

203. ld.
204. Jd.
205. ld. at 528.
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Sinlllar problems of bounded rationality might interfere with
contractual protection in another context in which courts imply a term
of irrevocability: namely in those contracts which take place over
time. fu such cases, the question posed by section 45, and resolved
affirmatively by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, is whether the
law should imply a term of irrevocability based on a certain number of
interim steps that constitute the beginning ofperformance.206
Before the law should supply a term of irrevocability, it becomes
important to determine why the offeror and offeree did not negotiate to
make the offer irrevocable in return for a certain number of
prespeci:fied interim steps and why the offeror and offeree did not take
other steps to control the possible opportunistic exploitation of the
relying party's sunk costs.
An interesting example of a section 45 contract, which may help
to illustrate the very real barriers that prevent express protection for a
party's sunk costs, involves "a community pledge[] to pay part of a
railroad's expenses if the railroad built a line to their community."207
After commencement of construction, the community reneged. 208 fu
such a case, the corrnnu.Ility faced U<'1Certain.1y because it may have
been unsure as to whether the railroad would actually be built and thus
the community may have wanted to retain the flexibility of not
committing any funds until completion of the railroad.
The
community could thereby insure against the prospect of payment for a
half built (and useless) railroad. The railroad faced uncertainty too
because it could not be certain that it could overcome all the hurdles to
building a railroad. Because it might turn out to be too costly or
difficult to build, the railroad might be reluctant to pledge ex ante to an
unconditional commitment to completion.
Given these multiple uncertainties faced by both parties, it will be
difficult for the parties to negotiate an enforceable contract in which
the community pledged payment in return for the railroad's promise to
complete. However, even if such a contract were not attainable, one
must then focus on subsidiary arrangements, short of an express fullycontingent bilateral contract that might protect against opportunism.
These arrangements could include fractionalizing performance into a
series of divisible steps. Such fractionalization that might be the

206. The beginning or tender of performance will serve to disable revocation of the
offer. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 45 cmt. d (1979).
207. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 9, at 527 (discussing Los Angeles
Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 67 P. 1086, 1088 (Cal. 1902)).
208. See id.

540

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73 :497

subject of an express bargain would be quite costly? 09 It might be hard
to foresee ex ante what interim steps the railroad could take that would
be conjecturable as the consideration to keep the offer irrevocable.
In addition, it might be costly to design and implement private
schemes to guard against the opportunistic exploitation of sunk costs
invested by the railroad. These could include costs incurred by
monitoring to determine ex ante whether the offeror, who would be
paying on completion, was trustworlhy. Efforts to learn enough about
the offeror would be costly and would affect the amount that the
offeree was willing to invest in sunk costs. The possibility of
expropriation and the hazard risk would be priced out by the parties
and could be costly.
Finally, it would be costly to design and implement payment
schemes to prevent the community offeror from acting
opportunistically once the sunk costs were invested by the railroad.
For example, variable payment schemes may work well to deter
shirking in cases where the payment can be adjusted to reward the
210
atilOUil.t of effort invested by an agent.
In section 45 option contract
cases, the party paying is the one who may be acting opportunistically.
The vulnerable party who has invested sunk costs is not in a position
to adjust the amount being paid to the offeror other than through
reduced reliance. However, even the adjustment of effort and reliance
that the railroad might make in response to the prospect of
opportunism by the community would be a costly control mechanism.
The railroad would not know in advance what the likelihood of the
community's nonpayment might be; discerning such information
could be costly. In such cases, given the assumption that parties prefer
to maximize smplus, and given the cost of private contractual or other
private control mechanism devices, the parties might prefer a
generalized law-supplied rule of irrevocability that would "save them
the costs of explicitly contracting over every change in the value of
their respective positions."211
Craswell prematurely suggests a law-supplied rule. This rule is
without an account of all the structural barriers and possible private
counter-strategies parties might use to surmount those barriers and
achieve their joint goals. It is not enough to suggest reasons why
209. See Discussions with Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law.
210. See generally David E.M. Sappington, Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, 5
J. EcoN. PERSP. 45 (1991) (discussing incentives and frictions in principal-agent
relationship).
211. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 692.
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parties might benefit from a law-supplied rule without also
determining whether other private solutions will work. Furthermore, if
contractual solutions are not feasible, it is necessary to determine if a
law-supplied rule can handle a perceived problem at a lesser cost than
any other private mechanisms.

B.

Farber and Matheson on Precontractual Liability

The absence of a comparative approach and the reliance on the
perceived benefits of "both to the promisor and to society as a
whole"212 to justify promissory estoppel and law-supplied
precontractualliability can be seen in the Daniel A. Farber and John H.
Matheson article. 213 Farber and Matheson urge the continued and
expanded use of promissory estoppel as a means of fostering "a high
level of trust."214 They argue that courts should recognize promissory
estoppel as an alternative to contracts with consideration because
where, as in precontractual negotiation, "such relationships are highly
interdependent, economic benefit is likely to be sought through
informal m1derstandings that reinforce the relationship, rather than
through discrete bargains."215 Willie Farber and Matheson are correct
in arguing that parties "operate according to informal
tmderstandings,"216 their article still fails to justify fully the proposition
that law-supplied intervention in the form of a liability rule should
recognize such informal understandings.
Their article fails to engage in a full comparison of other
altematives that parties could use to achieve trust. It is also not clear
whether the net benefits that would be acrueved with a law-supplied
rule would be greater than the net benefits that could be achieved by
other private efforts to control precontractual opportunism. Thus,
Farber and Matheson's article cannot fully justify the legal rule it
proposes-enforcing "[a] promise ... when made in furtherance of an
economic activity."217

Vl

SUBCONTRACTING REVISITED: SUBCONTRACTOR BIDDING AND
THE HIDDEN QUESTION OF LAW-SUPPLIED TERMS

The subcontractor bidding context presents still another arena in
which courts must confront the issue of whether the law should imply
212. Farber & Matheson, supra note 11, at 905.

213. See generally id.
!d. at 928.
!d. at925-26.
Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 648.
Farber & Matheson, supra note 11, at 930.

214.
215.
216.
217.
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a term or corrimitment not expressly negotiated. Current legal
approaches to the issue of protection for the general contractor's
reliance in the subcontracting context are hampered by some of the
deficiencies in the prior analyses. 218 These deficiencies include a
failure to address all of the behavioral assumptions affecting a bidding
transaction, a failure to analyze underlying uncertainty issues, a failure
to develop a comparative methodology to examine alternative lawsupplied rules beyond the current rule, a misplaced focus on
bargaining power issues, a failure to focus on the central issue of how
contractual hazards can be minimized so as to maximize surplus for
the parties, and a failure to address the appropriateness of a lawsupplied rule.
The failures of analysis help to explain the vacillation of courts
deciding whether to imply, by law, a term of irrevocability for the
subcontractor's offer once it has been relied on by the general
contractor if none has been agreed to express!y.2!9 hlitially, in Jarnes
Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Judge Learned Hand refused to imply a
term of irrevocability.220 Later, Justice Traynor overturned settled law
by implying a term of irrevocability in Drennan v. Star Paving Co. 221
The early Baird rule favored the subcontractor by denying all
contractual protection to the general contractor who had relied on the
subcontractor's bid. The current Drennan rule favors the general
contractor by creating an option contract and binding the subcontractor
to his offer while still allowing the general contractor the freedom to
reject the offer ofthe subcontractor. 222
Efforts to grapple with the issue of the propriety of implying a
term of in·evocability for the subcontractor's offer have been hampered
by the failure to grasp the underlying uncertainty problems and other
barriers which interfere with the negotiation of an express fully
contingent contract in the subcontractor context. Initially, that neglect
prompted Judge Hand to refuse to extend a.ny protection to the general
contractor who had not bargained for full contract protection in the
form of either an option contract or a fullblown bilateral contract. 223

218. See Kostritsky, Precontractual Liability, supra note II, at 399-400.
219. Compare James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933) (rejecting
law-supplied rule of irrevocability), with Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal.
1958) (implying term of irrevocability for a reasonable period of time to give offeree-general
contractor time to accept sub's offer).
220. 64 F.2d at 346.
221. 333P.2dat760-6l.
222. See FARNSWOR1H, supra note 157, § 3.25.
223. See Baird, 64 F.2d at 346.
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Absent such a contract, Judge Hand reasoned that reliance by the
general contractor should not be protected?24
Judge Hand's approach neglects the reality of the second-best
world ii1 which the subcontractor and contractor exist. He asswues
that absent an express fully contingent contract or a fullblown express
option, no protection should be offered for general contractors'
precontractual reliance. fu this reality of a second-best world,
however, the general contractor does not know ex ante whether he will
get the overall bid. Thus, the most he could offer the subcontractor
would be a conditional commitment. Under these circumstances a
bilateral contract of the type envisioned by Judge Hand is an unlikely
scenario. fu it, the subcontractor bargains for the use of the bid as an
acceptance, with that acceptance functioning as a promise to use the
subcontractor's services conditional only on being awarded the prime
bid. The subcontractor may be unwilling to furnish such an
unconditional promise of his own in return for only a conditional
commitment from the general contractor.
Here the value of
commitment might not furnish the subcontractor with enough value to
offset the subcontractor's having to stand ready to perform. The
subcontractor might be Ut1willli1g to be bow1d unconditionall~y fr.uough
an option contract to his offer of a service (at a specified price) in
exchange for only a conditional commitment by the general contractor
for si.rnilar reasons.
Judge Hand's unwillingness to focus on problems of bounded
rationality make him unable or unwilling to examine how a lawsupplied rule might "provide an incentive for each party to furnish the
sunk costs necessary to get a deal started without overprotecting the
general contractor."225 Furthermore, the parties face barriers to an
explicitly reciprocal exchange of unconditional commitments. This
examination would seek to determine whether a law-supplied rule of a
specified content would produce greater net benefits than would obtain
through the individualized negotiation of such conditional
commitments or other private solutions. Judge Hand assumes that the
absence of traditional bargained-for commitments should result in no
contract liability and no recovery for the general contractor.
The disinclination to face the realities of a second-best world
affecting the parties and an unwillingness to examine law-supplied
rules which might solve the problems of precontractual bargaining and
provide incentives for parties to rely better than the current Drennan or
224. See id.
225. Kostritsky, Precontractual Liability, supra note 11, at 400.
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Baird rules in subcontracting contexts is reflected in Professor Katz's
analysis of the problem. 226 He grapples with whether the law-supplied
option of section 87(2i 27 granting irrevocability to offers when the
general contractor has relied on the subcontractor's bid is justifiable.
Katz's analysis assumes that the Drennan rule of a law-supplied option
will make sense only where the general contractor is without
bargaining power and the subcontractor has all the bargaining power.
fu such contexts, without the Drennan rule, "a rational contractor
without any bargaining power would refuse to rely at all.'m 8 fu other
contexts, where the general contractor has the bargaining power, Katz
suggests that the principle of free revocability should obtain because
otheiWise subcontractors will delay making offers until the point
"when the uncertainty over their ability to perform will be resolved."229
In such contexts, the Drennan rule would be inefficient and should not
be supplied. 230
As I have explained elsewhere,231 Katz's approach fails to
cm1front the informational uncertainty problem. 232 The problem for
the general contractor is that bounded rationality limits his ability to
offer an unconditional commitment to the subcontractor; the general
contractor is not in a position ex ante to lmow whether it will be
awarded the overall bid. Hence, it can only make predictions based on
a probability distribution. 233 Similarly, the subcontractor may itself be
subject to intervening events between its offer and the award to the
general contractor. Any significant added burden might make it
difficult to stand by its bid.
fu addition to the problems of bounded rationality which tend to
preclude the ex ante exchange of unconditional commitments, there is
the added problem of the general contractor's sunk costs in taking
steps to finalize a deal wit~ the subcontractor. This makes the general
contractor vulnerable to opportunistic behavior in the absence of any
law-supplied commitment binding the subcontractor.
226. See Katz, supra note I 0, at 1253-66.
227. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 87(2) (1979) provides:

An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract
to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.
228. Katz, supra note 10, at 1274.
229. !d. at 1276.
230. See id. at 1277.
231. See Kostritsky, Precontractual Liability, supra note II, at 382.
232. See id. at 399.
233. See Discussion with Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law.
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Katz's analysis rejects a law-supplied Drennan rule in the case of
the contractor having all the bargaining power. He concludes that the
Drennan rule will cause "subcontractors [to] ... tend to avoid malcing
offers until the last possible moment."234 He does not respond to the
problem of uncertainty in the subcontracting context that would
disable the general contractor from being able to issue an
unconditional commitment. To deal with these realities, it is possible
to imagine that the contractor and subcontractor might negotiate an
exchange of conditional commitments. The projected exchange of
such commitments might help to promote appropriate incentives to
rely. Without a recognition of that aspect of bounded rationality, he
does not examine whether the commitment of the subcontractor could
be qualified in such a way as to maintain flexibility for the
subcontractor, while at the same time providing protection for the
general contractor's sunk costs in reliance on the subcontractor's bid.
This solution could avoid the subcontractor delaying his offer too long.
Because Katz does not examine the complete behavioral
characteristics of the transaction, he does not try to posit alternative
obligations wr.t.ich rr.J.~~t overcome some of the obstacles to an express
exchange of unconditional commitments in the pre-award context.
Nor does he attempt to analyze whether those alternative commitments
might be better in the sense of generating greater net benefits than
other private devices. That prevents Katz :fi.-om resolving the question
lurking behind the adoption of the Drennan rule (and behind any lawsupplied rule implying a term)-nan1ely whether the court should
intervene with a law-supplied rule of irrevocability or leave the matter
of irrevocability completely to the parties. Because the analysis does
not employ a comparative net benefit framework necessary in
resolving all questions of law-supplied terms or law-supplied
performance obligations, it leaves unresolved the fundamental
question confronting courts: when, if ever, is it justifiable for the law
to supply a term not expressly agreed to?
Katz's treatment of the question of the appropriateness of a lawsupplied rule of irrevocability of subcontractor offers incorrectly
focuses on the bargaining power issue. He indicates that where the
subcontractor/offeror has the bargaining power, "a rational contractor
[offeree] without any bargaining power would refuse to rely at all,
since he cannot capture any of the il].cremental gains from early
reliance, but he bears all of the risk."235 Katz indicates that the solution
234. Katz, supra note I 0, at 1276.
235. !d. at 1274.
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to the problem _of suboptimal investment and the danger of
expropriation of the sunk cost investment lies in the subcontractor's
offering of a "binding option in Week 3 . . . . The contractor will be
willing to accept this offer, because it affords him a small profit in the
event of performance and insures him against lost reliance in the event
of nonperformance."236 The inference seems to be that because the
subcontractor himself would offer such an option, then the law's
supply of such an option by inference would be efficient because it is
the solution that the parties themselves would have reached to promote
optimal reliance.
Katz's analysis of the subcontractor problem-with its focus on
the bargaining power issue-does not explain what the law should do
in the absence of an express agreement, nor provide an analytical
structure for resolving that question. Katz cannot explain why the law
should intervene because he has neither offered a framework for
intervention that looks at obstacles to private solutions, nor compared
such solt1tio11S to la·v/-supplied rules to detenrillle tl1c greatest net
benefits. Should a legal decisionrnaker imply a term of irrevocability
if the offeror himself fails to offer a binding option in Week 3 as Katz
predicted he would?
fu order to determine what a court should do in the absence of a
privately negotiated solution, it is necessary to examine the key factors
"responsible for differences" 237 amongst transactions:
bounded
rationality, asset specificity and opportunism. Using such factors, a
court could analyze the subcontractor/contractor context to determine
whether the parties would in fact encounter "contractual
difficulties."238 Williamson explains that when these factors coalesce,
the parties themselves may be unable to reach a completely contingent
contractual solution. Given those barriers, it would then be necessary
to examine possible alternative solutions to the problem of
opportunism and suboptimal investment.
Only when the
decisionrnaker is convinced that the law-supplied rule of irrevocability
would achieve greater net benefits than private solutions would it be
appropriate to intervene with a law-supplied rule.
Thus, although Katz was correct in identifying the danger of the
appropriability of investments and the possible negative effect on
contractor investments absent contractual protection, he fails to justify
the adoption of a law-supplied default rule in the form of section 87(2)
236. Id.at 1274-75.
237. WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTJTIJTIONS, supra note 18, at 52.
238. See id. at 67.
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of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Instead, he indicates that
the parties themselves will proffer a private solution when it is efficient
to do so. Katz therefore does not address the circumstances which
might justify a law-supplied default rule of irrevocability in the
absence of such private action. He does not invoke a framework that
might be useful in explaining why the parties were not able to reach
such a solution on their own and why a law-supplied rule should be
adopted. "Could [it] move the parties closer to what they wanted ...
and thereby increasing the gain from exchange, irrespective of who
ends up with what portion of the gain?"239
Katz's ability to resolve the issue of whether any law-supplied
rule is justified is also hampered by an overly restricted view of how to
judge the efficiency of investments in preliminary negotiations. Katz
attempts to pinpoint efficient investment as one geared to the "moment
at which it is optimal to begin investing."240 Efficient investments are
based on a comparison of the investing party's costs of waiting (more
expensive reliance if late) to the benefits of waiting (reduced
uncertainty). He explains that "[a]s time passes, the incremental costs
of delay will begin to exceed the incremental benefits of waiting.
From the standpoint of a planner concerned with maximizing social
wealth, this is the moment when the parties should be directed to
rely."241 However, he ignores the fact that the decision by one party to
invest will necessarily prompt danger of the opportunistic
appropriation of the investment and thus of a suboptimal investment.
This danger will require efforts to control the bad effects of
opportunism. The central question then becomes which strategies,
public or private, will best control the opportunism at the least cost,
preserve the surplus, and thereby achieve the greatest net benefits.
Therefore, Katz is misguided in thinking that it is possible to
"maximiz[e] social wealth"242 simply by comparing the costs and
benefits of waiting without also considering the costs of opportunism
and the costs of the efforts to control it. Only then can one really
determine when the surplus from the trade will be maximized. Katz
has removed consideration of the dissipation of the surplus through
"costly subgoal pursuit,"243 which would follow a transaction specific
investment. As a result, Katz does not consider the possible variety of
responses to control expropriation hazards.
Without a full
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47.
Katz, supra note 10, at 1268.

Id.
Id.
WTI..LIAMSON, EcoNOMIC lNSTITlTTIONS, supra note 18, at 63.
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consideration of those hazards, a detailed analysis of the costs and
benefits of legal rules, and private responses both contractual and
otherwise, one cannot determine if social wealth could be maximized.
Katz is unwilling to examine alternatives to the Drennan rule,
and he defends his bifurcated approach to the question of an implied
term of irrevocability for the subcontractor's offer. He reserves the
Drennan rule for cases where the subcontractors have the bargaining
power. 244 His unwillingness depends on a misplaced focus on the
relative bargaining power of the parties and on the split in surplus
between subcontractor and contractor. That conceptual misfocus
diverts Katz's attention from the central problem of maximizing
surplus by minimizing and controlling contractual hazards. Without
an inquiry into how surplus can be maximized by the control of
opportunism at the least cost, Katz cannot determine whether a lawsupplied term would be appropriate.
Katz's analysis of bargaining power leads him to posit that where
the offeror has the bargaining power, it will make correct decisions
because it will be able to capture the surplus?45 Where subcontractors
have the bargaining power, Katz reasons that the subcontractor "can
capture virtually all the gains from trade. " 246 The general contractor
''would refuse to rely at all, since he cannot capture any of the
incremental gains from early reliance, but he bears all the risk."247 To
counteract that diminished incentive for reliance, Katz speculates that
subcontractors will "offer a binding option in week 3"248 which will
encourage the contractor "to rely immediately. " 249 While "the
contractor breaks even,"250 the subcontractor's "expected profit is ...
the total surplus from the transaction."251
What is obscured in Katz's analysis of bargaining power issues is
a comparative analytical structure for resolving issues of legal
intervention.
The central analytical concern should be the
minimization of transaction costs so as to mitigate contractual hazards
and maximize the surplus. In a sense, contract law remains indifferent
as to how the surplus between the parties is split, though, of course,
bargaining power advantages will cause one party to garner a greater
part of the surplus. The important goal of the parties ex ante is to
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See Katz, supra note 10, at 1276.
See id. at 1273, 1275.
Id. at 1274.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1275.
Id.
Id.
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maxnmze the surplus by minimizing the transaction costs of
controlling contractual hazard.
Once the paramount concern of reducing the costs of controlling
contractual hazards is recognized, then the central question for the
legal decisionmaker becomes whether a proposed legal rule will
achieve the minimization of contractual hazard in precontractual
negotiation with greater net benefits than those of other alternatives.
The relative split of the surplus should be unimportant in crafting
formation rules.
Katz's misplaced concern with the respective shares of the
surplus that a party can be expected to gamer stems from his
incorporation of Oliver Hart's property model. 252 In that model, Hart
assumes that every contract will necessarily be incomplete and that
ownership and control rights may affect incentives to make
transaction-specific investments. 253 The greater the possible control of
the ex post surplus-which comes with ownership rights-the greater
a party's willingness to make investment increases. Similarly, a party
with a smaller fraction of the ex post surplus, due to lack of ownership,
will have diminished incentive to invest. Thus, there is an arguable
connection between the relative split of the surplus and the incentive to
invest. 254
Hart illustrates that connection using an example in the
automotive industry: the contract between GM and Fisher Body. 255 If
that contract is between two separate entities, then a question comes up
about whether the contract should require additional deliveries from
Fisher Body.Z56 For example, property rights will determine who has
the right to make that determination by asking who is "the owner of
the asset. "257 If Fisher Body owns the assets, it may refuse to consent
to GM's request for additional deliveries. 258
In the context of these types of contracts, the parties may face the
need for making transaction specific investments. Such investments
may, in tum, make the investing party vulnerable to opportunistic
expropriation.Z 59 In Hart's model, one response to this danger is
252. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTIJRE chs. 2, 3
(1995).
253. Seeid. at31.
254. Thus, the "expected shares in tum detennine [the parties'] incentives to make
specific investments in stage two." Katz, supra note 10, at 1279.
255. See HART, supra note 252, at 29-33.
256. Seeid.at31-32.
257. Id. at 30.
258. See id. at 31.
259. See id. at 32.
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integration; if o11e entity acquires another entity, then the "acquiring
firm's incentive to make relationship specific investments increases
since, given that it has more residual control rights, it will receive a
greater fraction of the ex post srnplus created by such investments. "260
Of course, integration itself may diminish the acquired party incentives
to invest "since, given that it has fewer residual control rights, it will
receive a smaller fraction of the incremental ex post srnplus created by
its own investments."261
Katz applies this property model of Oliver Hart to the
precontractual bargaining context in a way that obscures important
issues. First, Katz argues that in the context of precontractual
bargaining, the person who has the bargaining power in precontractual
negotiation can dictate the terms and capture the greatest portion of the
srnplus. This person is equivalent to the property owner with residual
control. Katz argues that the party with bargaining power, whether
offeree or offeror, will make optimal decisions because of the ability to
capture the srnplus. 262 Thus, if the subcontractor has the bargaining
power, he will make correct choices "without any legal protection. " 263
Thus, there is no need to imply a law-supplied term of irrevocability if
the subcontractor has bargaining power because he will make the
correct decisions. As the party with bargaining power, Katz argues,
the subcontractor will capture the "benefits of reliance, which she can
accomplish if she has all the bargaining power; she will have
appropriate incentive to weigh costs against benefits."264
However, I would argue that the focus on the party with
bargaining power with the attendant ability to capture srnplus is
misplaced for several reasons. First, the attempt at identification of the
party able to capture the greater fraction of the ex post srnplus and thus
with greater bargaining power separate ,and apart from the investment
of sunk costs seems fruitless. It is the investment of sunk costs by one
party which necessarily gives the power of exappropriation of those
sunk costs. That power to expropriate should be the focus rather than
an abstract concern with bargaining power. The focus should be on
which party has invested sunk costs and thereby stands to risk
expropriation. If that becomes the focus, then it becomes anomalous
to separate the discussion of bargaining power separate and apart from
sunk costs. If the inquiry is refocused in that way, then the reliance on
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 33.
Id.
See Katz, supra note 10, at 1273-74.
Id. at 1273 (emphasis added).
Id.
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the subcontractor's offer is a kind of sunk cost which subjects the
general contractor to expropriation and the relevant question becomes
how to mitigate the danger of opportunism and protect the general
contractor.
The bargaining power focus does not resolve what the law should
do about a diminished incentive to invest. This diminished incentive
may come from the other party having the power to expropriate sunk
costs. Katz's analysis does recognize that if one does identify a party
with bargaining power, then the party who is without bargaining
power will experience a diminished incentive to invest. "[S]ince he
cannot capture any of the incremental gains from early reliance . . . he
bears all the risk. "265
Although Katz supposes that in the case of subcontractor power,
the subcontractor will overcome the offeror's reluctance to invest by
offering an option. However, there is nothing in the bargaining model
itself which suggests what the law should do in the absence of such an
arrangement. In part, the focus on bargaining power in Katz is a
surrogate for Hart's model based on who has residual control. That
property based asset control focus of Hart's was never intended to
resolve whether and in what circumstances the law should intervene.
Because Hart assumed that "the only way to influence investment
incentives is by allocating asset ownership,"266 he did not examine
alternatives to integration and asset allocation.
Focusing on bargaining power also leads Katz to analyze the
issue of the irrevocability of a subcontractor's offer solely in terms of
what the greater bargaining power of the offeree general contractor
will allow the general to extract from the subcontractor. Under the
Katz analysis, the greater bargaining power of the general will
discourage early options by subcontractors, because contractors with
bargaining power will reject the options and "turn around and offer her
or one ofher competitors a last-minute, take-it-or-leave.:it offer to do
the job at just over cost."267 It would be a mistake to imply
irrevocability for subcontractor bids where they lack bargaining power
because it would delay offers.
That possibility will cause
subcontractors to delay offers "until the last possible moment."268 To
avoid the risk and possibility of overly long delays in subcontractors
making offers, Katz would deny the possibility of protecting general
contractors.
265.
266.
267.
268.

!d. at 1274.
HART, supra note 252, at 85.
Katz, supra note I 0, 1276.
!d.
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The focus on bargaining power diverts Katz from analyzing what
impediments prevented a fully contingent contract exchanging
unconditional commitments, and from whether the subcontractor
could offer the general contractor a flexible commitment in return for a
conditional commitment from the general contractor which could
respond to those impediments and protect each party without offering
too much protection to either party.
Katz's model neither focuses on what the problems each party
faces in preliminary negotiation are, nor tries to propose solutions,
whether law-supplied or private, which might solve those problems.
This leads Katz to suggest no protection for general contractors with
bargaining power because it will offer "too much protection."269 The
question should be how can each party be encouraged to invest in the
relationship by the minimization of opportunism, and if so, how can
such mitigation be achieved with the greatest net benefits?
A misplaced focus on bargaining power also leads Katz to
assume that the party with the bargaining power with the attendant
ability to "capture virtually all gains from trade" 270 will lead that party
to make correct decisions. For example, if the subcontractor has the
bargaining power, Katz thinks that "[s]he will want to bind herself just
in time for optimal reliance."271
Here I think the difficulty lies in Katz's assumption that one can
identify a party with the ability to capture the greater portion of the
surplus apart from the issue of identifying the investment of sunk
costs. Katz also mistakenly argues that identifying such party will lead
to correct decisions by the party with such bargaining power. 272 In
fact, Hart makes a more limited claim for parties who have residual
control rights. 273 Such control will prompt the party with control to
make more transaction specific investments, secure in the knowledge
that the "threat of expropriation"274 of such investment is diminished.
In the context of subcontracting, this might suggest that if the party
that initially invests the sunk costs-the general contractor-remains
subject to expropriation by the other party, then it is unlikely such
party will make optimal decisions even if you argue that such party has
greater initial bargaining power.

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id.
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1273.
HART, supra note 252, at 85.
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Katz has used the Hart idea of residual control and imported it
into the context of precontractual negotiation and identified the party
·with bargaining power as the surrogate for the one with residual
ownership. Aside from the difficulty of separating bargaining power
from the investment of sunk costs, the model is also difficult to import
into the precontractual context because the model itself assumes that
the contract is necessarily incomplete. Hart does not examine whether
there are contractual devices, other private strategies or law-supplied
rules which will ameliorate the danger of expropriation. Hart assumes
"the only way to influence investment incentives is by allocating asset
ownership."275 Hence, the usefulness in the context of a debate about
whether the law should intervene with an implied term seems
questionable. Thus, although there is some dissatisfaction with the
one-sided protection for the general contractor (which has led some
commentators and courts to suggest that the Drennan rule should
perhaps be curtailed),276 that dissatisfaction with the Drennan rule of
irrevocability or with the opposite early rule of revocability will not be
resolved without the development of a new structure for resolving the
imnortant issue of a law-sunnlied tenn. That stmcnm~ will r~onin~ th~
recognition of the bounded rationality, sunk costs, and opportunism
endemic to subcontractor settings. That structure also requires the
development of a comparative analysis to determine how the hazards
of opportunism can be minimized ex ante, given the presence of
bounded rationality and sunk costs, so as to maximize surplus.
Without such an analysis, courts and commentators will continue to
vacillate on the issue of the protection of general contractors without a
means of rationally resolving the issue.
.l.
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CONCLUSION

The question of when the law should imply terms or
commitments not expressly agreed to by the parties is a fundamental
one but its resolution remains unrealized. Scholars trying to resolve
the question have made a number of analytical errors which have
hampered a clear or fruitful analysis. They have failed to confront all
of the relevant behavioral assumptions needed to resolve legal
intervention questions. They have obscured the nature oflaw-supplied
interventions. Their justification sometimes confuses instances in
which the law refuses to add terms beyond those agreed to expressly
275. Id. at 85.
276. See Pavel Enters. v. A.S. Johnson Co., 674 A.2d 521, 523 (Md. 1996) (fmding
that detrimental reliance was "not applicable to the facts of this case'').
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with instances in which the law intervenes. This subjects those
fundamentally different situations to a unified analysis and obscures
the nature of a framework needed to justify legal intervention.
The most fundamental error in scholarship attempting to resolve
law-supplied default rules is the consistent failure to incorporate a
comparative net benefit comparative methodology for resolving when
and how the law should intervene. Recognition of the importance of
that comparative element of analysis furnishes the basis for a critique
of the current penalty default rule developed by Professors Ayres and
Gertner. That critique posits that the penalty default approach still
lacks a framework for determining when it is appropriate to intervene
with law-supplied rules. Moreover, the penalty default approach
remains problematic because it assumes rather than justifies,
intervention as a response to strategic behavior. The absence of a
comparative net benefit :fra..uework has also ha..upered the
commentators' approaches to resolving the fundamental question of
whether a law-supplied rule is appropriate in the precontractual and
subcontractor bidding contexts.

